Re: Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-30 Thread Thorsten Glaser
On Tue, 29 Apr 2014, Steven Chamberlain wrote: > On Mon, 28 Apr 2014 16:52:10 + (UTC), daThorsten Glaser wrote: > > For their OpenSSL fork, specifically, they rely on some system > > properties such as their RNG’s behaviour way too much [...] > > I would think Linux and FreeBSD have much bett

Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-29 Thread Steven Chamberlain
Here's a good catch I think: http://freshbsd.org/commit/openbsd/b6c83fa20a2269dadd0a9a73049813c75c2bcbbb SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS disables a workaround for the weakness described in https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt which, I think, was exploited by the BEAST attack ~9 years later

Re: Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-29 Thread Steven Chamberlain
On Mon, 28 Apr 2014 16:52:10 + (UTC), daThorsten Glaser wrote: > For their OpenSSL fork, specifically, they rely on some system > properties such as their RNG’s behaviour way too much [...] I would think Linux and FreeBSD have much better PRNGs now than what has been done until now in OpenSSL.

Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-29 Thread Kevin Chadwick
previously on this list Thomas Goirand contributed: > > OpenBSD developers are extensively cleaning up OpenSSL 1.0.1g > > I'm not so sure if "cleaning-up" really means removing 90k lines of code > without extensive checks. I'd very much prefer some unit tests added to > the current code base, o

Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-29 Thread Thomas Goirand
On 04/21/2014 02:07 AM, Steven Chamberlain wrote: > OpenBSD developers are extensively cleaning up OpenSSL 1.0.1g I'm not so sure if "cleaning-up" really means removing 90k lines of code without extensive checks. I'd very much prefer some unit tests added to the current code base, or a *long* audi

Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-28 Thread daThorsten Glaser
Steven Chamberlain pyro.eu.org> writes: > I'd say the code still looks quite 'portable' in that it is ANSI C and > isn't using kernel-specific features. arc4random is just a library > routine from their libc and I see no reason it can't be borrowed. No, it’s more. And after sysctl() got remove

Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-28 Thread daThorsten Glaser
Kurt Roeckx roeckx.be> writes: > On Sun, Apr 20, 2014 at 07:07:45PM +0100, Steven Chamberlain wrote: > > But meanwhile, OpenBSD developers are extensively cleaning up OpenSSL > > 1.0.1g. > > One of the problems with anything from OpenBSD is that they only > care about OpenBSD, and if you want t

Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-21 Thread Steven Chamberlain
On 21/04/14 09:21, Kurt Roeckx wrote: > OpenBSD also replaced RC4 with ChaCha20, while Linux probably still > uses RC4. We should stop using RC4. I figured OpenSSH must be already using arc4random, and sure enough it seems to bundle an implementation of ChaCha already: http://sources.debian.net/s

Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-21 Thread Kevin Chadwick
On Mon, 21 Apr 2014 10:55:36 +0200 Kurt Roeckx wrote: > > I'm not sure what you're trying to say here. But look at the > > example of the random number generator in my other e-mail. I've > > seen other cases were they do things like that. And I can > > perfectly understand why they do it, and t

Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-21 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 12:34:12AM +0100, Kevin Chadwick wrote: > previously on this list people contributed: > > > On Sun, Apr 20, 2014 at 07:07:45PM +0100, Steven Chamberlain wrote: > > > Hi, > > > > > > But meanwhile, OpenBSD developers are extensively cleaning up OpenSSL > > > 1.0.1g. > > >

Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-21 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 02:38:52AM +0100, Steven Chamberlain wrote: > > They've ripped out this whole PRNG now to use the one from their own libc: > > http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c.diff?r1=1.14;r2=1.15 And I think just a change like that might wo

Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-20 Thread Steven Chamberlain
I agree it's not going to be portable in the near term, though there are interesting changes being made and good code review happening. Some dubious entropy sources were (only potentially?) used with RAND_seed/add: digests: http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_a

Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-20 Thread Kevin Chadwick
previously on this list people contributed: > On Sun, Apr 20, 2014 at 07:07:45PM +0100, Steven Chamberlain wrote: > > Hi, > > > > But meanwhile, OpenBSD developers are extensively cleaning up OpenSSL > > 1.0.1g. > > One of the problems with anything from OpenBSD is that they only > care about Op

Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-20 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Sun, Apr 20, 2014 at 07:07:45PM +0100, Steven Chamberlain wrote: > Hi, > > But meanwhile, OpenBSD developers are extensively cleaning up OpenSSL > 1.0.1g. One of the problems with anything from OpenBSD is that they only care about OpenBSD, and if you want to use that fork you'll actually have

Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-20 Thread Marco d'Itri
On Apr 20, Steven Chamberlain wrote: > I wonder if this might result in an alternate SSL/TLS library we could > use in Debian? Let's see next year how much the OpenBSD thing will be: - portable - interoperable - gaining new features They are removing things like FIPS support which are vital for

Re: Hardened OpenSSL fork

2014-04-20 Thread Michael Banck
Heya, On Sun, Apr 20, 2014 at 07:07:45PM +0100, Steven Chamberlain wrote: > I wonder if this might result in an alternate SSL/TLS library we could > use in Debian? Probably - but I think there is enough time left for jessie that we don't need to jump to conclusion already and can watch this unfol