Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-27 Thread Martin Langhoff
On Wed, May 28, 2008 at 11:13 AM, Colin Watson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I think everyone involved did a wonderful job, especially given the > appalling constraints they were under. There is a difference, though, > between acknowledging the excellent work that was done and burying one's > head i

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-27 Thread Colin Watson
On Tue, May 27, 2008 at 01:45:25AM +0200, Klaus Ethgen wrote: > Am Di den 27. Mai 2008 um 1:09 schrieb Colin Watson: > > On Thu, May 15, 2008 at 09:15:57AM -0700, Mike Bird wrote: > > > The rollout of information and updates was appalling - even adding in > > > the material from Ubuntu the informa

Re: changing subjects when discussion becomes slightly off-topic - Was: Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-16 Thread Richard Kettlewell
"Miriam Ruiz" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Maybe there should also be a clasification of packages according to > how bad would a bug be in them for the whole system, so that patches > in those could be more carefully reviewed. Perhaps uploads could come with the diff against the last version (or

Re: changing subjects when discussion becomes slightly off-topic - Was: Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-16 Thread Miriam Ruiz
2008/5/16 Thibaut Paumard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > the topic has already been changed to "ssl security desaster", and in my > opinion this is precisely what my post is about: what can we learn from this > disaster. (More precisely, I'm giving my 2c on what level of patching is > acceptable in a Debi

Re: changing subjects when discussion becomes slightly off-topic - Was: Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-16 Thread Thibaut Paumard
Le 16 mai 08 à 15:04, Olivier Berger a écrit : Le vendredi 16 mai 2008 à 14:48 +0200, Thibaut Paumard a écrit : Let's hope this discussion will, in the end, bring good ideas and trigger actual work to improve Debian, and perhaps the free software community at large. Best regards, Thibaut.

changing subjects when discussion becomes slightly off-topic - Was: Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-16 Thread Olivier Berger
Le vendredi 16 mai 2008 à 14:48 +0200, Thibaut Paumard a écrit : > Let's hope this discussion will, in the end, bring good ideas and > trigger actual work to improve Debian, and perhaps the free software > community at large. > > Best regards, Thibaut. > > That'd be great. But please, ma

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-16 Thread Thibaut Paumard
Hi, Le 16 mai 08 à 13:48, Martin Uecker a écrit : "Kevin B. McCarty" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: If you see packages for which a Debian-specific patch seems unnecessary, please by all means file a bug (severity wishlist) requesting that the patch be either reverted or submitted upstream.

Re: Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-16 Thread Martin Uecker
"Kevin B. McCarty" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > If you see packages for which a Debian-specific patch seems unnecessary, > please by all means file a bug (severity wishlist) requesting that the > patch be either reverted or submitted upstream. Most time the patch is already submitted upstream,

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-15 Thread Kevin Buhr
Peter Samuelson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > Who is this "we"? Whose serious efforts? Who is investigating? Most > importantly, should we assume that, as in the past, you, Mike Bird, > intend to do nothing but talk? I think this is a common stylistic choice. I consider myself part of the De

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-15 Thread Stephen Gran
This one time, at band camp, Mike Bird said: > Yet Debian makes it hard for people to help. Like most software > engineers I simply don't have the time to waste on Debian's NM > process. Debian's processes are indisputably Debian's decision > alone, but Debian has to live with the consequences ..

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-15 Thread Thibaut Paumard
Hi, Le 15 mai 08 à 20:17, Mike Bird a écrit : Nevertheless, non-DD's can and do help by filing bug reports and patches (upstream is best), helping people on d-u, and offering constructive advice to DDs. And maintaining packages! It can be long to find a sponsor for your first package (espec

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-15 Thread Peter Samuelson
[Mike Bird] > Nevertheless, non-DD's can and do help by filing bug reports and > patches (upstream is best), helping people on d-u, and offering > constructive advice to DDs. Very well. I propose that anyone who wishes to give "constructive advice" to developers, but who doesn't actually do any

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-15 Thread Mike Bird
On Thu May 15 2008 10:34:01 Peter Samuelson wrote: > Who is this "we"? Whose serious efforts? Who is investigating? Most > importantly, should we assume that, as in the past, you, Mike Bird, > intend to do nothing but talk? Debian is still one of the world's best distros and I hope it continues

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-15 Thread Peter Samuelson
[Mike Bird] > but we should blame the process. And fix it. > it would probably have been better to devote less effort to the > scanner and more effort to documenting all the kinds of key > replacements > Serious efforts are needed > Second, we must ensure > This calls for a thorough investiga

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-15 Thread Kevin B. McCarty
Martin Uecker wrote: > Am Donnerstag, den 15.05.2008, 17:33 +0200 schrieb Thijs Kinkhorst: >> If you're interested in for example changing the level to which software is >> patched in Debian, I suggest to start with a representative review of what >> gets patched and why it's done. That would g

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-15 Thread Thijs Kinkhorst
On Thursday 15 May 2008 18:26, Martin Uecker wrote: > Why not? A plane crash is a very rare incident. Still every single > crash is investigated to make recommendations for their future > avoidance. Maybe that wasn't clear from my first mail, but I don't think that nothing can be learned from thi

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-15 Thread Martin Uecker
Am Donnerstag, den 15.05.2008, 17:33 +0200 schrieb Thijs Kinkhorst: > On Thursday 15 May 2008 16:47, Martin Uecker wrote: > > > You mean less likely than once in 15 years? We're open to your > > > suggestions. > > > > Something as bad as this might be rare, still, if something can be > > improved,

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-15 Thread Mike Bird
On Thu May 15 2008 08:33:54 Thijs Kinkhorst wrote: > I welcome change and review of our processes, but taking one extreme > incident as the base on which to draw conclusions seems not the wise thing > to do. If you're interested in for example changing the level to which > software is patched in De

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-15 Thread Mike Bird
On Thu May 15 2008 06:20:10 Thijs Kinkhorst wrote: > You mean less likely than once in 15 years? We're open to your suggestions. Leaving millions of systems open to crackers for 2 years out of 15 is not a joke. I don't blame the DD - we have all made mistakes and most of us are lucky they weren't

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-15 Thread Thijs Kinkhorst
On Thursday 15 May 2008 16:47, Martin Uecker wrote: > > You mean less likely than once in 15 years? We're open to your > > suggestions. > > Something as bad as this might be rare, still, if something can be > improved, it should. > > Upstream complained about the extensive Debian patching. I think

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-15 Thread Martin Uecker
Am Donnerstag, den 15.05.2008, 15:20 +0200 schrieb Thijs Kinkhorst: > On Thursday 15 May 2008 14:04, Martin Uecker wrote: > > If I understand this correctly, this means that not only should keys > > generated with the broken ssl lib be considered compromised, but all > > keys which were potentially

Re: ssl security desaster (was: Re: SSH keys: DSA vs RSA)

2008-05-15 Thread Thijs Kinkhorst
On Thursday 15 May 2008 14:04, Martin Uecker wrote: > If I understand this correctly, this means that not only should keys > generated with the broken ssl lib be considered compromised, but all > keys which were potentially used to create DSA signatures by those > broken libs. > > In this case, the