On Wed, May 28, 2008 at 12:00:47AM +0100, Colin Watson wrote:
> On Tue, May 27, 2008 at 05:49:59PM +0200, Patrik Fimml wrote:
> > No, actually, /all/ keys I generated were allegedly weak -- this means,
> > after
> > executing ssh-keygen and dowkd.pl five times, I stuck to the key.
>
> This rings
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Sorry, I did not answer to the list:
Am Mi den 28. Mai 2008 um 1:13 schrieb Colin Watson:
> > It is never ever a good idea to make security issues secret or
> > protracting it.
> >
> > And in this special case it was easy to fix the problem very fas
"Martin Langhoff" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> On Wed, May 28, 2008 at 11:13 AM, Colin Watson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > I think everyone involved did a wonderful job, especially given
> > the appalling constraints they were under.
>
> A wonderful job indeed. *Thanks* from this corner of the
On Wed, May 28, 2008 at 11:13 AM, Colin Watson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I think everyone involved did a wonderful job, especially given the
> appalling constraints they were under. There is a difference, though,
> between acknowledging the excellent work that was done and burying one's
> head i
On Tue, May 27, 2008 at 01:45:25AM +0200, Klaus Ethgen wrote:
> Am Di den 27. Mai 2008 um 1:09 schrieb Colin Watson:
> > On Thu, May 15, 2008 at 09:15:57AM -0700, Mike Bird wrote:
> > > The rollout of information and updates was appalling - even adding in
> > > the material from Ubuntu the informa
On Tue, May 27, 2008 at 05:49:59PM +0200, Patrik Fimml wrote:
> On Tue, May 27, 2008 at 04:51:36PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
> > > Well, I actually had false positives (on amd64) -- even freshly
> > > generated keys with the new libopenssl package were reported as bad,
> > > which irritated me a
* Florian Weimer:
> Well, you can send me the key in private if you want. Let's see if I
> can factor it. 8-)
I got the key from Patrik, but it's not contained in my blacklist. We
couldn't find a dowkd version that flagged the key as weak, nor could we
definitely confirm that the very same key
Tollef Fog Heen wrote:
> * Martin Uecker
[...]
> | There was a thread "building packages with exact binary matches"
> | about it. Unfortunately, most people seem to think that this is not
> | worth it.
>
> I don't think that's unfortunate; I think it's a waste of resources
> better spent elsewh
* Martin Uecker
| Tollef Fog Heen wrote:
|
| > How would you go about doing that? If you just mean «all packages
| > should be built on the buildds», that's fairly easy to do, but if you
| > are talking about actual verification of source => binary which can be
| > done post-mortem, that's much
Tollef Fog Heen wrote:
> * Martin Uecker
>
> | Another problem I have argued about before, not directly related to this
> | incident, but IMHO another desaster waiting to happen: There is no
> | way to independetly validate that a debian binary package was
> | created from the corresponding sourc
* Thibaut Paumard:
> Actually, I seem to remember that the issue of critical packages being
> maintained by only one person have been pointed out here several times
> already this year (although I don't remember the particular
> threads). Certainly, such packages needs a better QA than the rest.
On Fri, May 16, 2008 at 03:27:42PM -0500, Adam Majer wrote:
> Russ Allbery wrote:
> > Martin Uecker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> >
> >> In this case, the security advisory should clearly be updated. And all
> >> advise about searching for weak keys should be removed as well, because
> >> it leads
Tollef Fog Heen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> * Martin Uecker
> | What bothers me too is the fact that the installer scripts of all
> | packages have root permissions during installation. While this might
> | be hard to do, in principle I see no good reason why installer
> | scripts could not be
* Martin Uecker
| Another problem I have argued about before, not directly related to this
| incident, but IMHO another desaster waiting to happen: There is no
| way to independetly validate that a debian binary package was
| created from the corresponding source.
How would you go about doing th
Russ Allbery wrote:
> Martin Uecker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
>> In this case, the security advisory should clearly be updated. And all
>> advise about searching for weak keys should be removed as well, because
>> it leads to false sense of security. In fact, *all* keys used on Debian
>> machi
Martin Uecker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I don't now. I see no reason why all this good work which now ends up in
> Debian patches can't be seperated from the actual packaging work.
It's probably worth mentioning somewhere in this discussion that one of
the most common, perhaps the most common
Hi Kevin!
"Kevin B. McCarty" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Martin Uecker wrote:
[...]
> Well, *assuming* the patch is good, a subset of users of the software
> (i.e. Debian users and users of downstream distributions) benefit from
> it between the time it's applied in Debian and the time it's ap
Hi Martin,
Martin Uecker wrote:
> "Kevin B. McCarty" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> If you see packages for which a Debian-specific patch seems unnecessary,
>> please by all means file a bug (severity wishlist) requesting that the
>> patch be either reverted or submitted upstream.
>
> Most tim
Le 16 mai 08 à 15:41, Miriam Ruiz a écrit :
2008/5/16 Thibaut Paumard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
[...] Maybe there should also be a
clasification of packages according to how bad would a bug be in them
for the whole system, so that patches in those could be more carefully
reviewed.
Actually, I see
"Miriam Ruiz" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Maybe there should also be a clasification of packages according to
> how bad would a bug be in them for the whole system, so that patches
> in those could be more carefully reviewed.
Perhaps uploads could come with the diff against the last version (or
2008/5/16 Thibaut Paumard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> the topic has already been changed to "ssl security desaster", and in my
> opinion this is precisely what my post is about: what can we learn from this
> disaster. (More precisely, I'm giving my 2c on what level of
ibaut.
That'd be great.
But please, may I suggest that only matters applying to keys, SSH, SSL
be kep in the same Subject in the thread for future archives digging ?
Thanks in advance.
Hi,
the topic has already been changed to "ssl security desaster", and in
my opinion this
Le vendredi 16 mai 2008 à 14:48 +0200, Thibaut Paumard a écrit :
> Let's hope this discussion will, in the end, bring good ideas and
> trigger actual work to improve Debian, and perhaps the free software
> community at large.
>
> Best regards, Thibaut.
>
>
That'd be great.
But please, ma
Hi,
Le 16 mai 08 à 13:48, Martin Uecker a écrit :
"Kevin B. McCarty" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
If you see packages for which a Debian-specific patch seems
unnecessary,
please by all means file a bug (severity wishlist) requesting that
the
patch be either reverted or submitted upstream.
"Kevin B. McCarty" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> If you see packages for which a Debian-specific patch seems unnecessary,
> please by all means file a bug (severity wishlist) requesting that the
> patch be either reverted or submitted upstream.
Most time the patch is already submitted upstream,
Peter Samuelson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> Who is this "we"? Whose serious efforts? Who is investigating? Most
> importantly, should we assume that, as in the past, you, Mike Bird,
> intend to do nothing but talk?
I think this is a common stylistic choice. I consider myself part of
the De
This one time, at band camp, Mike Bird said:
> Yet Debian makes it hard for people to help. Like most software
> engineers I simply don't have the time to waste on Debian's NM
> process. Debian's processes are indisputably Debian's decision
> alone, but Debian has to live with the consequences ..
Hi Mikhail,
Mikhail Gusarov wrote:
> Twas brillig at 10:30:44 15.05.2008 UTC-07 when Kevin B. McCarty did gyre and
> gimble:
>
> KBM> Believe me, there are lots of upstreams for which extensive
> KBM> patching really is necessary. (I have no idea whether OpenSSL is
> KBM> one of those, as I
Hi,
Le 15 mai 08 à 20:17, Mike Bird a écrit :
Nevertheless, non-DD's can and do help by filing bug reports and
patches (upstream is best), helping people on d-u, and offering
constructive advice to DDs.
And maintaining packages! It can be long to find a sponsor for your
first package (espec
[Mike Bird]
> Nevertheless, non-DD's can and do help by filing bug reports and
> patches (upstream is best), helping people on d-u, and offering
> constructive advice to DDs.
Very well. I propose that anyone who wishes to give "constructive
advice" to developers, but who doesn't actually do any
On Thu May 15 2008 10:34:01 Peter Samuelson wrote:
> Who is this "we"? Whose serious efforts? Who is investigating? Most
> importantly, should we assume that, as in the past, you, Mike Bird,
> intend to do nothing but talk?
Debian is still one of the world's best distros and I hope it
continues
Mikhail Gusarov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Probably the work then should be clearly labeled as fork (especially
> given the other distro maintainers also share some patches)? It will
> reduce the confusion, like "oh, erm, our is not quite upstream
> , we rewrote it from scratch, and left the n
[Mike Bird]
> but we should blame the process. And fix it.
> it would probably have been better to devote less effort to the
> scanner and more effort to documenting all the kinds of key
> replacements
> Serious efforts are needed
> Second, we must ensure
> This calls for a thorough investiga
Twas brillig at 10:30:44 15.05.2008 UTC-07 when Kevin B. McCarty did gyre and
gimble:
KBM> Believe me, there are lots of upstreams for which extensive
KBM> patching really is necessary. (I have no idea whether OpenSSL is
KBM> one of those, as I have no familiarity with its code nor the
KBM>
Martin Uecker wrote:
> Am Donnerstag, den 15.05.2008, 17:33 +0200 schrieb Thijs Kinkhorst:
>> If you're interested in for example changing the level to which software is
>> patched in Debian, I suggest to start with a representative review of what
>> gets patched and why it's done. That would g
On Thursday 15 May 2008 18:26, Martin Uecker wrote:
> Why not? A plane crash is a very rare incident. Still every single
> crash is investigated to make recommendations for their future
> avoidance.
Maybe that wasn't clear from my first mail, but I don't think that nothing can
be learned from thi
Am Donnerstag, den 15.05.2008, 17:33 +0200 schrieb Thijs Kinkhorst:
> On Thursday 15 May 2008 16:47, Martin Uecker wrote:
> > > You mean less likely than once in 15 years? We're open to your
> > > suggestions.
> >
> > Something as bad as this might be rare, still, if something can be
> > improved,
On Thu May 15 2008 08:33:54 Thijs Kinkhorst wrote:
> I welcome change and review of our processes, but taking one extreme
> incident as the base on which to draw conclusions seems not the wise thing
> to do. If you're interested in for example changing the level to which
> software is patched in De
On Thu May 15 2008 06:20:10 Thijs Kinkhorst wrote:
> You mean less likely than once in 15 years? We're open to your suggestions.
Leaving millions of systems open to crackers for 2 years out of 15
is not a joke. I don't blame the DD - we have all made mistakes
and most of us are lucky they weren't
On Thursday 15 May 2008 16:47, Martin Uecker wrote:
> > You mean less likely than once in 15 years? We're open to your
> > suggestions.
>
> Something as bad as this might be rare, still, if something can be
> improved, it should.
>
> Upstream complained about the extensive Debian patching. I think
Am Donnerstag, den 15.05.2008, 15:20 +0200 schrieb Thijs Kinkhorst:
> On Thursday 15 May 2008 14:04, Martin Uecker wrote:
> > If I understand this correctly, this means that not only should keys
> > generated with the broken ssl lib be considered compromised, but all
> > keys which were potentially
Martin Uecker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> In this case, the security advisory should clearly be updated. And all
> advise about searching for weak keys should be removed as well, because
> it leads to false sense of security. In fact, *all* keys used on Debian
> machines should be considered com
On Thursday 15 May 2008 14:04, Martin Uecker wrote:
> If I understand this correctly, this means that not only should keys
> generated with the broken ssl lib be considered compromised, but all
> keys which were potentially used to create DSA signatures by those
> broken libs.
>
> In this case, the
"Steinar H. Gunderson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> On Thu, May 15, 2008 at 05:11:27AM +0200, Goswin von Brederlow wrote:
>
> > Also if you have 2 messages signed with the same random number you can
> > compute the secret key. It is more complicated then this but
> > simplified boils down to is computin
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