Re: ssh, /dev/urandom

2002-12-18 Thread Werner Koch
On Wed, 18 Dec 2002 11:58:52 +0100, Gaël Le Mignot said: > This is the current implementation, yes, but /dev/urandom doesn't guarantee > anything about the "quality" of the random bits. It can be secure, but it It does. It even blocks (well, I checked years ago) as long as the entropy pools has

Re: ssh, /dev/urandom

2002-12-18 Thread Werner Koch
On Tue, 17 Dec 2002 13:36:21 +0100, Gaël Le Mignot said: > And /dev/urandom is not really done for "cryptographic secure" randomness, > it's the goal of /dev/random, not /dev/urandom (and AFAIK ssh only uses That is not really true. The common implementations of /dev/[u]random for *BSD and Linux

Re: be supernatural

2001-11-02 Thread Werner Koch
ts in a more appropriate way. Ciao, Werner -- Werner KochOmnis enim res, quae dando non deficit, dum habetur g10 Code GmbH et non datur, nondum habetur, quomodo habenda est. Privacy Solutions-- Augustinus

Re: dev random and urandom

2001-10-29 Thread Werner Koch
entations apply a hash at least to the output (see rfc1750 for the reasons, why this is a Good Thing). So you can't do any statistical tests on the output. The only way to analyze a CSPRNG is by a careful aanlyze of the code. Werner -- Werner KochOmnis enim res, quae dando non defici

Re: Random Device

1998-11-04 Thread Werner Koch
"Thomas Bushnell, BSG" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > I've thought a little about this. I think the best sources of random > bits come from disk latencies and keystroke patterns and network Especially keystrokes. Ted Tso's driver is GPLed and not very system dependend. (/usr/src/linux/drivers/c