Kurt Roeckx dijo [Sun, Apr 20, 2014 at 12:51:45AM +0200]:
> On Sat, Apr 19, 2014 at 09:41:40PM +, Clint Adams wrote:
> > Upon request. Made with an unpackaged set of keyrings[0].
>
> Thanks for the update.
> (...)
> So we seem to making some progress, and I hope the rest will
> follow soon.
On Sat, Apr 19, 2014 at 09:41:40PM +, Clint Adams wrote:
> Upon request. Made with an unpackaged set of keyrings[0].
Thanks for the update.
So we had in january:
DDs:
623 "DSA"
624 1024
DMs:
54 "DSA"
54 1024
non-upload:
0 "DSA"
0 1024
In february:
DDs:
611
Upon request. Made with an unpackaged set of keyrings[0].
(/tmp/keyrings/debian-keyring.gpg)
Total primary keys: 994
Key versions:
994 4
Primary key pubkey algorithms:
550 "DSA"
444 "RSA"
Primary key pubkey sizes:
551 1024
28 2048
3 3072
409 4096
2 8192
Hello,
On Sat, 5 Apr 2014 09:50:23 +0200
Jakub Wilk wrote:
> >My point was this attack vector (nonfree code running on the same
> >machine as your OpenPGP key) taken to it's absolute extreme (wine,
> >dropboxd) is still *not* grounds for automated removal from the
> >keyring.
> It's a popula
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