Phillip Hofmeister wrote:
> The same information can be gathered from your MTA (if you are
> running one) by doing an RCPT TO: and then an RSET.
This is not universally true and is generally a matter of how the MTA
is configured.
--
Jamie Heilman http://audible.transient.net/~j
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On Tue, 06 May 2003 20:13:41 + Deger Cenk Erdil
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> But, if I can intercept your "trigger sequence messages" as an
> attacker
> on your subnet, or even on the Net, I can replicate the same
> sequence
> quite easily!
Hi.
There are two serious problems to this security scheme, either of which
would be enough to make it not worthwhile to implement.
1) Ease of implementation. To implement this security measure for, let's
say, ssh, every legitimate user would need special ssh client software, or
a software wra
On Tue, May 06, 2003 at 01:07:24PM -0500, Mark Edgington wrote:
> Hi,
> I'm not sure whether this idea has been considered or implemented
> anywhere, but I have been thinking about it, and believe it would provide a
> fairly high-level of security for systems which only run a few public
> se
On Tue, 06 May 2003 13:07:24 -0500
Mark Edgington <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> it doesn't matter if others are
> connecting to port 80, etc. while he is doing these connections, as long as
> no-one
> else is trying to connect to any of the ports in the trigger-sequence list --
> this is
>
On Tue, 06/05/2003 13:07 -0500, Mark Edgington wrote:
> incorporate functionality into inetd/xinetd/rinetd which listens for a
> predefined sequence of connection attempts on certain ports. Upon noticing
> the correct sequence (as specified somewhere in the config file), it opens
> up certain p
On Tue, May 06, 2003 at 01:07:24PM -0500, Mark Edgington wrote:
> Hi,
> I'm not sure whether this idea has been considered or implemented
> anywhere, but I have been thinking about it, and believe it would provide a
> fairly high-level of security for systems which only run a few public
> se
Hi
On Tue, May 06, 2003 at 01:07:24PM -0500, Mark Edgington wrote:
> I'm not sure whether this idea has been considered or implemented
> anywhere, but I have been thinking about it, and believe it would provide a
> fairly high-level of security for systems which only run a few public
> serv
On Tue, 06 May 2003 at 05:47:37PM +0200, Diederik de Vries wrote:
> Hi there!
Greets,
>
> Today I was surfing on SecurityFocus, and saw that there was a hole in
> OpenSSH (http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/7482/info/). Debian Potato
> uses OpenSSH 3.1 p1, which seems to be exploitable.
>
> Is th
Looks like a good idea. I am not sure it has been implemented but it has
some problems though..
About the case if someone is connected to your "secret sequence" ports,
you can configure your machine so that there will be a server that is
always listening to those ports and not allowing any con
Hi,
I'm not sure whether this idea has been considered or implemented anywhere, but I
have been thinking about it, and believe it would provide a fairly high-level of
security for systems which only run a few public services. The gist of it is this:
incorporate functionality into inetd/xinetd
* Diederik de Vries <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [030506 17:47]:
> Today I was surfing on SecurityFocus, and saw that there was a hole in
> OpenSSH (http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/7482/info/). Debian Potato
> uses OpenSSH 3.1 p1, which seems to be exploitable.
I think you might be interessted in: http://
Yes,
It's somewhat of a new bug that spawned from the media service advisory on
user enumeration via a timing issue if OpenSSH is compiled with PAM support.
It's not a remote root per say, but mainly an enumeration weakness.
By applying 'nodelay' option for pam_unix.so, this 'feature' is remedie
On Tue May 06, 2003 at 05:4737PM +0200, Diederik de Vries wrote:
> Hi there!
>
> Today I was surfing on SecurityFocus, and saw that there was a hole in
> OpenSSH (http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/7482/info/). Debian Potato
> uses OpenSSH 3.1 p1, which seems to be exploitable.
>
> Is this true, am
Hi there!
Today I was surfing on SecurityFocus, and saw that there was a hole in OpenSSH (http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/7482/info/). Debian Potato uses OpenSSH 3.1 p1, which seems to be exploitable.
Is this true, am I missing something or what?
Thanks!
Diederik de Vries
Netnation Eur
On Tue, 6 May 2003, Florian Weimer wrote:
> Drew Scott Daniels <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> > This bug may be worked around (and therefore downgraded) by having a
> > configuration to warn the user that they must trust the DNS servers
> > (wherever this is configured), and must trust the users.
Drew Scott Daniels <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> This bug may be worked around (and therefore downgraded) by having a
> configuration to warn the user that they must trust the DNS servers
> (wherever this is configured), and must trust the users.
Are you sure that you only need to trust the DNS s
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