martin f krafft <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> ... sounds like a nice way to infest a system with a trojan, in
> addition to kernel modules and other Linux maladities. That is, if
> the attacker gets root...
However, root can also patch the init image and get the same result. So it
is better if init
also sprach Noah Meyerhans <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2006.01.04.1829 +0100]:
> Yes, but we've already established through years of experience that,
> once an attacker has root access, all bets are off.
Of course. It's not like the attacker couldn't just replace
/sbin/init anyway.
--
Please do not sen
On Wed, Jan 04, 2006 at 06:25:02PM +0100, martin f krafft wrote:
> > Nevertheless the sysvinit maintainers thought it would be a good
> > idea to ask here whether anyone sees any security problems arising
> > from this feature.
>
> ... sounds like a nice way to infest a system with a trojan, in
>
also sprach Thomas Hood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2006.01.04.1619 +0100]:
> Nevertheless the sysvinit maintainers thought it would be a good
> idea to ask here whether anyone sees any security problems arising
> from this feature.
... sounds like a nice way to infest a system with a trojan, in
addition
Hello security experts.
In #345741 the submitter has requested that /sbin/init be enhanced
such that it can be re-executed from another path. The idea is that
"telinit -e INIT_PROG=/path/to/other/init" could be done prior to
"telinit u".
Reasons for introducing this feature are given in the disc
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