Re: Security implications of allowing init to re-exec from another path

2006-01-04 Thread Bernd Eckenfels
martin f krafft <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > ... sounds like a nice way to infest a system with a trojan, in > addition to kernel modules and other Linux maladities. That is, if > the attacker gets root... However, root can also patch the init image and get the same result. So it is better if init

Re: Security implications of allowing init to re-exec from another path

2006-01-04 Thread martin f krafft
also sprach Noah Meyerhans <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2006.01.04.1829 +0100]: > Yes, but we've already established through years of experience that, > once an attacker has root access, all bets are off. Of course. It's not like the attacker couldn't just replace /sbin/init anyway. -- Please do not sen

Re: Security implications of allowing init to re-exec from another path

2006-01-04 Thread Noah Meyerhans
On Wed, Jan 04, 2006 at 06:25:02PM +0100, martin f krafft wrote: > > Nevertheless the sysvinit maintainers thought it would be a good > > idea to ask here whether anyone sees any security problems arising > > from this feature. > > ... sounds like a nice way to infest a system with a trojan, in >

Re: Security implications of allowing init to re-exec from another path

2006-01-04 Thread martin f krafft
also sprach Thomas Hood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2006.01.04.1619 +0100]: > Nevertheless the sysvinit maintainers thought it would be a good > idea to ask here whether anyone sees any security problems arising > from this feature. ... sounds like a nice way to infest a system with a trojan, in addition

Security implications of allowing init to re-exec from another path

2006-01-04 Thread Thomas Hood
Hello security experts. In #345741 the submitter has requested that /sbin/init be enhanced such that it can be re-executed from another path. The idea is that "telinit -e INIT_PROG=/path/to/other/init" could be done prior to "telinit u". Reasons for introducing this feature are given in the disc