Re: Iceweasel and web browsers vulnerabilty concerning poodle.

2014-10-16 Thread Yves-Alexis Perez
On jeu., 2014-10-16 at 10:28 -0500, Marco Galicia wrote: > *shoulnd't iceweasel be recompiled to include this option in the > complilation settings??* You're not asking at the correct place, it's a bit unlikely the maintainer read that list. But in any case, Mozilla themselves intend to disable S

Re: Iceweasel and web browsers vulnerabilty concerning poodle.

2014-10-16 Thread Pedro Worcel
Sorry about the double email, this is the original source for Mozilla https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2014/10/14/the-poodle-attack-and-the-end-of-ssl-3-0/ 2014-10-17 9:12 GMT+13:00 Pedro Worcel : > ​Just something related I happened to stumble across: > > http://www.bit-tech.net/news/bits/2014/

Re: Iceweasel and web browsers vulnerabilty concerning poodle.

2014-10-16 Thread Pedro Worcel
​Just something related I happened to stumble across: http://www.bit-tech.net/news/bits/2014/10/15/google-mozilla-sslv3/1​

Re: Iceweasel and web browsers vulnerabilty concerning poodle.

2014-10-16 Thread Brad Cable
I would like to point out what security.tls.version.min actually does: http://kb.mozillazine.org/Security.tls.version.* Setting security.tls.version.min to 1 allows TLSv1.0 to be used, which is vulnerable to a similar padding oracle attack (and timing oracle attacks) found long ago. You shoul

Iceweasel and web browsers vulnerabilty concerning poodle.

2014-10-16 Thread Marco Galicia
Hi, As I know, a new vulnerability called poodle has been discovered regadirng https. This vulnerabilty takes advantage of the ssl 3.0, and forcecs the https protocol to use this outdated protocol. I have been told that a fix for this vulnerabilty is to disable the use of this protocol in the web

Re: [Reproducible-builds] concrete steps for improving apt downloading security and privacy

2014-10-16 Thread Hans-Christoph Steiner
René Mayrhofer wrote: > On 2014-09-25 06:24, Hans-Christoph Steiner wrote: >> >> W. Martin Borgert wrote: >>> On 2014-09-24 23:05, Hans-Christoph Steiner wrote: * the signature files sign the package contents, not the hash of whole .deb file (i.e. control.tar.gz and data.tar.gz). >>>