On Mon, 2017-08-28 at 12:58 +0200, Aurelien Jarno wrote:
[...]
> > > These files haven't been built on a build daemon, but instead have
> > > been uploaded by the maintainer [1]. This is therefore not a buildd
> > > issue, the issue has been fixed there already with the upgrade to
> > > stretch.
>
3c8a49bac4f88dc5a762f usr/share/man/man1/sancov-3.9.1.gz
It appears the rsync backups were corrupted by new packages recently
build for unstable that were source-modified in June:
<http://metadata.ftp-master.debian.org/changelogs/main/l/llvm-toolchain-3.9/llvm-toolchain-3.9_3.9.1-11_changelog>
Regards,
Adam Warner
ize-changes and --dry-run to check for modifications without
making changes to the destination).
Regards,
Adam Warner
Hi all,
Can anyone give me a tip as to how I can automate this:
Say I wish to run this script remotely and interactively using SSH
3.4p1-1:
#!/bin/bash
apt-get update
apt-get upgrade -u
(let's call the script apt-upgrade)
This doesn't work:
$ ssh [EMAIL PROTECTED] '/root/apt-upgrade'
On Sun, 2002-07-07 at 23:22, J.H.M. Dassen (Ray) wrote:
On Sun, Jul 07, 2002 at 23:13:13 +1200, Adam Warner wrote:
This doesn't work:
$ ssh [EMAIL PROTECTED] '/root/apt-upgrade'
Use ssh -t [EMAIL PROTECTED] '/root/apt-upgrade'. From ssh(1):
-t Force pseudo-tty allocation
Dear Michael Stone and the rest of the Debian security team,
I'm very impressed at your successful demonstration of how well the new
security infrastructure can work. Getting out a response this quick for
OpenSSH 3.4 for all 11 Woody architectures is remarkable.
The chaos surrounding these
On Tue, 2002-01-22 at 23:31, martin f krafft wrote:
also sprach Adam Warner [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2002.01.22.0511 +0100]:
I realise now that I have witnessed this kind of issue before (In some
circumstances, it's possible for a non-privileged process to have `root'
as the login name returned
On Wed, 2002-01-23 at 00:35, Preben Randhol wrote:
Adam Warner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote on 22/01/2002 (10:00) :
Here's how you can reproduce it (running Debian unstable):
1. Log in as root
2. su - user
if you here write whoami instead of starting X what does it say?
As expected
On Tue, 2002-01-22 at 23:31, martin f krafft wrote:
also sprach Adam Warner [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2002.01.22.0511 +0100]:
I realise now that I have witnessed this kind of issue before (In some
circumstances, it's possible for a non-privileged process to have `root'
as the login name returned
On Wed, 2002-01-23 at 00:35, Preben Randhol wrote:
Adam Warner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote on 22/01/2002 (10:00) :
Here's how you can reproduce it (running Debian unstable):
1. Log in as root
2. su - user
if you here write whoami instead of starting X what does it say?
As expected
On Mon, 2002-01-21 at 23:40, martin f krafft wrote:
snip
nevertheless, leave a root console open on a production machine really
just calls for trouble. imagine you are about to head for lunch with a
friend, but you decide to check something in the server room quickly.
while you stare at
On Tue, 2002-01-22 at 03:11, martin f krafft wrote:
also sprach Adam Warner [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2002.01.21.1444 +0100]:
Martin, it's a server in my spare room :-) The only person installing a
backdoor on the server would be an unlawful intruder. Or a cat who can
type ;-) Your points
On Tue, 2002-01-22 at 07:41, Federico Grau wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On Sun, Jan 20, 2002 at 11:04:13AM +1300, Adam Warner wrote:
Hi everyone,
...
The question I have is if I su - username and then browse the web,
etc. is it impossible for a remote user
On Tue, 2002-01-22 at 12:21, martin f krafft wrote:
also sprach Adam Warner [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2002.01.21.2307 +0100]:
Federico, are you saying that if you su - to a user account (from root)
and then start X that you are running X as root? If so that is a major
problem.
no, he actually
On Tue, 2002-01-22 at 05:26, martin f krafft wrote:
this is a proof-of-concept post. it's a FreeBSD exploit, thus it may or
may not have been, be, or will be applicable to Debian Linux or Linux in
general. you have been warned. properly.
On Mon, 2002-01-21 at 23:40, martin f krafft wrote:
snip
nevertheless, leave a root console open on a production machine really
just calls for trouble. imagine you are about to head for lunch with a
friend, but you decide to check something in the server room quickly.
while you stare at your
On Tue, 2002-01-22 at 03:11, martin f krafft wrote:
also sprach Adam Warner [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2002.01.21.1444 +0100]:
Martin, it's a server in my spare room :-) The only person installing a
backdoor on the server would be an unlawful intruder. Or a cat who can
type ;-) Your points are well
On Tue, 2002-01-22 at 07:41, Federico Grau wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On Sun, Jan 20, 2002 at 11:04:13AM +1300, Adam Warner wrote:
Hi everyone,
...
The question I have is if I su - username and then browse the web,
etc. is it impossible for a remote user
On Tue, 2002-01-22 at 12:21, martin f krafft wrote:
also sprach Adam Warner [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2002.01.21.2307 +0100]:
Federico, are you saying that if you su - to a user account (from root)
and then start X that you are running X as root? If so that is a major
problem.
no, he actually
On Sun, 2002-01-20 at 15:16, Kevin Littlejohn wrote:
On Sun, Jan 20, 2002 at 02:45:53PM +1300, Adam Warner wrote:
Can anyone provide a plausible scenario for how someone might be able to
gain root level access because su - has been used to switch to a user
account. Martin has already
On Sun, 2002-01-20 at 16:25, Mustafa Baig wrote:
Hi,
I updated and restarted bind today. Looking into syslog I noticed the following line:
Jan 19 19:22:44 cold named[7247]: starting (/etc/bind/named.conf). named
8.2.3-REL-NOESW Sat Jan 27 01:46:37 MST 2001
Hi everyone,
I'm just wondering about the safety of this security practice.
Firstly the servers are physically secure and there is no relevant issue
about having a local root console open for administration purposes.
The question I have is if I su - username and then browse the web,
etc. is it
On Sun, 2002-01-20 at 15:16, Kevin Littlejohn wrote:
On Sun, Jan 20, 2002 at 02:45:53PM +1300, Adam Warner wrote:
Can anyone provide a plausible scenario for how someone might be able to
gain root level access because su - has been used to switch to a user
account. Martin has already
On Sun, 2002-01-20 at 16:25, Mustafa Baig wrote:
Hi,
I updated and restarted bind today. Looking into syslog I noticed the
following line:
Jan 19 19:22:44 cold named[7247]: starting (/etc/bind/named.conf). named
8.2.3-REL-NOESW Sat Jan 27 01:46:37 MST 2001 [EMAIL
On Tue, 2002-01-15 at 09:44, Florian Weimer wrote:
Adam Warner [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
http://www.linuxtoday.com/news_story.php3?ltsn=2002-01-14-002-20-SC-DB
Someone with better knowledge of all the facts might want to comment on
the claim that Debian is always the last to fix
On Wed, 2002-01-16 at 01:07, Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña wrote:
Already did it yesterday (except for th column with the data).
See
http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/ch11.en.html#s11.3
Please consider removing any reference to the average amount of time in
the
On Tue, 2002-01-15 at 09:44, Florian Weimer wrote:
Adam Warner [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
http://www.linuxtoday.com/news_story.php3?ltsn=2002-01-14-002-20-SC-DB
Someone with better knowledge of all the facts might want to comment on
the claim that Debian is always the last to fix
On Wed, 2002-01-16 at 01:07, Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña wrote:
Already did it yesterday (except for th column with the data).
See
http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/ch11.en.html#s11.3
Please consider removing any reference to the average amount of time in
the
http://www.linuxtoday.com/news_story.php3?ltsn=2002-01-14-002-20-SC-DB
Someone with better knowledge of all the facts might want to comment on
the claim that Debian is always the last to fix security holes and the
tag team follow up I've been fighting for months now to try to convince
them to
On Tue, 2002-01-15 at 01:41, Daniel Polombo wrote:
Adam Warner wrote:
On Tue, 2002-01-15 at 01:05, Tim Haynes wrote:
Some of us wouldn't dare say such things without at least reviewing the
given distro's security policy, FAQ and history.
But I was really impressed that updates
http://www.linuxtoday.com/news_story.php3?ltsn=2002-01-14-002-20-SC-DB
Someone with better knowledge of all the facts might want to comment on
the claim that Debian is always the last to fix security holes and the
tag team follow up I've been fighting for months now to try to convince
them to
On Tue, 2002-01-15 at 01:05, Tim Haynes wrote:
Adam Warner [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
http://www.linuxtoday.com/news_story.php3?ltsn=2002-01-14-002-20-SC-DB
Someone with better knowledge of all the facts might want to comment on
the claim that Debian is always the last to fix security
On Tue, 2002-01-15 at 01:41, Daniel Polombo wrote:
Adam Warner wrote:
On Tue, 2002-01-15 at 01:05, Tim Haynes wrote:
Some of us wouldn't dare say such things without at least reviewing the
given distro's security policy, FAQ and history.
But I was really impressed that updates
33 matches
Mail list logo
