Re: security-tracker: A proposal to significantly reduce reported false-positives (no affected-code shipped)

2024-04-04 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
* [Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 11:11:20PM +0100] Samuel Henrique: On the proposed solution I also mention that we can use the "(free text comment)" section to indicate that, while sticking to "not-affected", this would simplify things as no new value is needed. But parsing the cases where only the sourc

Re: security-tracker: A proposal to significantly reduce reported false-positives (no affected-code shipped)

2024-04-03 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
* [Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 09:21:41AM +0100] Samuel Henrique: # Alternative solutions: If we really want to distinguish the case when we don't produce any affected packages but the source contains the vulnerability (a build with different flags might result in an affected package), we can create a n

Re: xz backdoor prevention and hosts.deny?

2024-04-01 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
* [Sun, Mar 31, 2024 at 09:28:46PM +] Nick Sal: With respect to debian testing, assume we filter SSH access only to a subnet using the files host.{deny,allow} (see below). Would this prevent the attack if a malicious payload was not sent from the allowed subnet? I've not seen any reference

Re: Upcoming stable point release (12.6)

2024-03-30 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
* [Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 10:24:09PM +] Adam D. Barratt: Due to recent events, the point release has been postponed. A new date will be announced when possible. Given the centrality of xz, and standing that AFAIK the intricacies of the attack are not yet fully understood, should we expect a

Re: Bullseye security.debian.org codename misconfigured?

2022-01-22 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
* [Sat, Jan 22, 2022 at 11:09:20AM +0100] Stefan Fritsch: I think the bullseye-security codename should be "bullseye" instead. Or am I missing something The repo naming scheme has changed with bullseye. I do not have the announcement at hands, however the old '/updates' is now '-security', s

Re: deb.debian.org vs security.debian.org

2021-08-19 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
* [Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 01:25:00AM -0500] Daniel Lewart: Is there a preferred sources.list URI for the Debian security repository between: * http://deb.debian.org/debian-security * http://security.debian.org/debian-security I asked in debian-devel and received two replies: * https://lists.deb

Re: fun with mailinglists (was Re: Is chromium updated?)

2020-11-13 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
* [Fri, Nov 13, 2020 at 05:26:56AM -0500] John Runyon: Why do we have such messages on the security mailing list? Is there a way to get actual security team announcements without all this spam? That's a job for debian-security-announce@l.d.o (please note the '-announce' suffix) Ciao, Gian Pi

Re: Checking for services to be restarted on a default Debian installation

2014-09-03 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
* [Mon, Sep 01, 2014 at 08:48:25PM +0200] Thijs Kinkhorst: [needrestart] - Do people agree that this would be something that's good to have in a default installation? Are there drawbacks? I like needrestart and I added it to my standard toolbox since its admission in Debian (well, it took some

Re: Hash algorithms used by APT to verify authenticity of installed files.

2011-05-02 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
* [Fri, Apr 29, 2011 at 07:57:28PM +0200] Tomasz Wozowicz: "ForceHash "sha256"; // hashmethod used for expected hash: sha256, sha1 or md5sum" It doesnt say what will happen if the expected hash is unavaible- maybe it will just use weaker hash as fallback? No. After all, it's named "ForceHash"

Re: Hash algorithms used by APT to verify authenticity of installed files.

2011-04-23 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
* [Sat, Apr 23, 2011 at 12:04:33PM +0200] Quequanys: Does it fallback to weaker algorithm, if the hash made with stronger one is not avaible? Is there a way to force APT to use only selected algorithms so APT only accepts files verified by choosen algorithms, and rejects files when required hash

Re: Recent updates

2008-02-16 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
Il giorno Sun, 17 Feb 2008 00:46:19 -0500 "Jim Popovitch" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ha scritto: > I haven't seen any other news about this, I show 7 pending updates for > which no DSA or notices have gone out. As resulting from the candidate URI, they are from the main repository not the security one.

Re: iptables and nmap

2007-06-07 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
Il giorno Thu, 7 Jun 2007 15:51:51 +0200 "Joan Hérisson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ha scritto: > So I added this rule : > "iptables -A tcp_packets -p TCP -i eth1 -s > 0/0 --dport 8080 -j allowed" > where eth1 is the way toward my local network >

Re: Large, constant incoming traffic

2004-05-13 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
Il gio, 2004-05-13 alle 19:53, Kjetil Kjernsmo ha scritto: [...] > 19:41:32.083993 217.77.34.162.2090 > 226.58.55.41.1434: udp 376 [ttl 1] > 19:41:32.192344 217.77.34.162.2090 > 234.247.236.46.1434: udp 376 [ttl > 1] A switched lan, I see ;) It can be slammer [1] (if so, I guess why the ISP te

Re: Large, constant incoming traffic

2004-05-13 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
Il gio, 2004-05-13 alle 19:53, Kjetil Kjernsmo ha scritto: [...] > 19:41:32.083993 217.77.34.162.2090 > 226.58.55.41.1434: udp 376 [ttl 1] > 19:41:32.192344 217.77.34.162.2090 > 234.247.236.46.1434: udp 376 [ttl > 1] A switched lan, I see ;) It can be slammer [1] (if so, I guess why the ISP te

Re: Delayed disclosure and Debian manifesto (was Re: DSA 438 - bad server time, bad kernel version or information delayed?)

2004-02-20 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
Il ven, 2004-02-20 alle 12:13, Michael Stone ha scritto: > >Well, I really don't want to feed a troll, but this is a theme I'm > >wondering about from a while... > > Then do a web search. It's been discussed before in way too much detail > and repeating the arguments just brings out the trolls. Y

Some clarifications about the Debian-security-HOWTO

2004-02-20 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
From http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/ch9.en.html#s9.1.6 > When a security fix is prepared, packages are prepared for unstable > and the patch is back ported to stable (since stable is usually some > minor or major versions behind). Packages for the stable distribution > are

Re: Delayed disclosure and Debian manifesto (was Re: DSA 438 - bad server time, bad kernel version or information delayed?)

2004-02-20 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
Il ven, 2004-02-20 alle 12:13, Michael Stone ha scritto: > >Well, I really don't want to feed a troll, but this is a theme I'm > >wondering about from a while... > > Then do a web search. It's been discussed before in way too much detail > and repeating the arguments just brings out the trolls. Y

Delayed disclosure and Debian manifesto (was Re: DSA 438 - bad server time, bad kernel version or information delayed?)

2004-02-20 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
Il ven, 2004-02-20 alle 05:58, John Galt ha scritto: > "we won't hide problems" ... Well, I really don't want to feed a troll, but this is a theme I'm wondering about from a while... Shouldn't the delayed disclosure be regarded a a sort of, at least partially, infringement of the Debian manifesto

Some clarifications about the Debian-security-HOWTO

2004-02-20 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
From http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/ch9.en.html#s9.1.6 > When a security fix is prepared, packages are prepared for unstable > and the patch is back ported to stable (since stable is usually some > minor or major versions behind). Packages for the stable distribution > are

Delayed disclosure and Debian manifesto (was Re: DSA 438 - bad server time, bad kernel version or information delayed?)

2004-02-20 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
Il ven, 2004-02-20 alle 05:58, John Galt ha scritto: > "we won't hide problems" ... Well, I really don't want to feed a troll, but this is a theme I'm wondering about from a while... Shouldn't the delayed disclosure be regarded a a sort of, at least partially, infringement of the Debian manifesto

DSA-361-2

2003-08-14 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
Hi all, can anyone explain me the DSA-361-2? Does it mean that the vulnerabilities reported were already addressed in woody in version 2.2.2-6woody2 ? I haven't found 2.2.2-6woody2 in the changelog, however 2.2.2-6 has been released in december 2001, so i've to assume fake vulnerabilities (CAN 200

Re: DSA-361-2

2003-08-14 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
Il lun, 2003-08-11 alle 02:58, Matt Zimmerman ha scritto: > > I haven't found 2.2.2-6woody2 in the changelog, however 2.2.2-6 has been > > released in december 2001 > > 2.2.2-6woody2 is a later version than 2.2.2-6. 2.2.2-6 has the bugs, > 2.2.2-6woody2 has the fixes. 2.2.2-6 has been released

Re: DSA-361-2

2003-08-11 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
Il lun, 2003-08-11 alle 12:22, Gian Piero Carrubba ha scritto: > DSA-361-1 states that the vulnerabilities reported have been fixed in > 2.2.2-13.woody.8 (and this is the version you can find in the > repository)... DSA-361-2 is the same advisory, except that it states > that the vul

Re: DSA-361-2

2003-08-11 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
Il lun, 2003-08-11 alle 12:22, Gian Piero Carrubba ha scritto: > DSA-361-1 states that the vulnerabilities reported have been fixed in > 2.2.2-13.woody.8 (and this is the version you can find in the > repository)... DSA-361-2 is the same advisory, except that it states > that the vul

Re: DSA-361-2

2003-08-11 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
Il lun, 2003-08-11 alle 02:58, Matt Zimmerman ha scritto: > > I haven't found 2.2.2-6woody2 in the changelog, however 2.2.2-6 has been > > released in december 2001 > > 2.2.2-6woody2 is a later version than 2.2.2-6. 2.2.2-6 has the bugs, > 2.2.2-6woody2 has the fixes. 2.2.2-6 has been released

DSA-361-2

2003-08-10 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
Hi all, can anyone explain me the DSA-361-2? Does it mean that the vulnerabilities reported were already addressed in woody in version 2.2.2-6woody2 ? I haven't found 2.2.2-6woody2 in the changelog, however 2.2.2-6 has been released in december 2001, so i've to assume fake vulnerabilities (CAN 200

Re: Snort exploit in wild.

2003-04-25 Thread Gian Piero Carrubba
Il ven, 2003-04-25 alle 11:19, David Ramsden ha scritto: > Noticed on vil.mcafee.com that a proof of concept exploit for Snort to > exploit the vuln. found in v1.8 through to 1.9.1. up to 2.0rc1 as reported by cert > What's the status of a patch from Debian Security? No DSA yet either. > I know