For amusement I checked the web logs for a few debian machines to see
if they had some red worm attempts. Seems we've been probed a fair
bit: 16 times on www.spi-inc.org, 22 on non-us.debian.org and 18
on www.debian.org. Almost all attempts were made on July 19. Aren't
we glad we all run Linux? :
Previously Thomas Bushnell, BSG wrote:
> The *security* team exists to make security updates to the current
> stable release. Currently there is *not* an installable update for
> gnupg. The only way (that I can think of right now) for fixing this
> is to put the new mailcrypt into security.debian
Previously Thomas Bushnell, BSG wrote:
> Ok, that's a fine reason. But then the working mailcrypt needs to be
> installed, or the security fix has only been half-done.
There is a fixed mailcrypt in proposed-updates.
Wichert.
--
___
Previously Thomas Bushnell, BSG wrote:
> The *security* team exists to make security updates to the current
> stable release. Currently there is *not* an installable update for
> gnupg. The only way (that I can think of right now) for fixing this
> is to put the new mailcrypt into security.debia
Previously Thomas Bushnell, BSG wrote:
> Ok, that's a fine reason. But then the working mailcrypt needs to be
> installed, or the security fix has only been half-done.
There is a fixed mailcrypt in proposed-updates.
Wichert.
--
__
Previously Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
> Thaks for handling this so fast, guys!
More like slow, I had it all ready 2 days ago except for lack of
an alpha running potato :(
Wichert.
--
_
/ Nothing is fool-proof to a
Previously Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
> Thaks for handling this so fast, guys!
More like slow, I had it all ready 2 days ago except for lack of
an alpha running potato :(
Wichert.
--
_
/ Nothing is fool-proof to a
Previously Florian Weimer wrote:
> With GnuPG 1.0.4, the web of trust can be compromised by an attacker,
How?
> and there's a pretty severe problem with detached signature
> verification.
That was fixed months ago, check the changelog.
Wichert.
--
__
Previously Florian Weimer wrote:
> With GnuPG 1.0.4, the web of trust can be compromised by an attacker,
How?
> and there's a pretty severe problem with detached signature
> verification.
That was fixed months ago, check the changelog.
Wichert.
--
_
Previously Wouter Cloetens wrote:
> Extra details on the bug report for gnupg-1.04-2 can be found
> on http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2797. Most distributions
> appear to have reported a security alert, but all recommend
> upgrading to 1.0.6. A backport for stable is in order,
It's being worked
Previously Wouter Cloetens wrote:
> Extra details on the bug report for gnupg-1.04-2 can be found
> on http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2797. Most distributions
> appear to have reported a security alert, but all recommend
> upgrading to 1.0.6. A backport for stable is in order,
It's being worke
Previously Dominik 'IronHand' Dalek wrote:
> Writing man page before options parser isn't the best idea though ;)
Actually it is a good idea: it indicates that you know exactly
what you are going to write and given that some good thought.
Wichert.
--
__
Previously Dominik 'IronHand' Dalek wrote:
> Writing man page before options parser isn't the best idea though ;)
Actually it is a good idea: it indicates that you know exactly
what you are going to write and given that some good thought.
Wichert.
--
_
Previously Philipp Schulte wrote:
> Straightforward question: Is this version vulnerable? What does the
> "pl" in the Debian-version mean?
patchlevel I guess, it's a modified version of vixia cron. RH is
not vulnerable to this one.
Wichert.
--
Previously Philipp Schulte wrote:
> Straightforward question: Is this version vulnerable? What does the
> "pl" in the Debian-version mean?
patchlevel I guess, it's a modified version of vixia cron. RH is
not vulnerable to this one.
Wichert.
--
___
Previously Josip Rodin wrote:
> I'm currently reviewing a new version of joe that uses patches from other
> sources, and this is the chunk of code they used to fix this issue:
Lets see what they did :)
> /*
>A race condition still exists between the lstat() and
Previously Josip Rodin wrote:
> I'm currently reviewing a new version of joe that uses patches from other
> sources, and this is the chunk of code they used to fix this issue:
Lets see what they did :)
> /*
>A race condition still exists between the lstat() an
Previously Samu wrote:
> what's the deal ? is it debian ftp ( i used ftp.debian.org, ftp.it.debian.org
> and others ) cracked ? is it better ignore it ?
No, dpkg supports signatures in packages now but since packages aren't
signed yet it can't verify then and it will abort.
This is indeed a some
Previously Samu wrote:
> what's the deal ? is it debian ftp ( i used ftp.debian.org, ftp.it.debian.org
> and others ) cracked ? is it better ignore it ?
No, dpkg supports signatures in packages now but since packages aren't
signed yet it can't verify then and it will abort.
This is indeed a som
Previously Philipp Schulte wrote:
> I am running Apache 1.3.9 and I am wondering, if this might be a
> security issue. There is always one Apache-process running as root.
That process doesn't process requests, it only accepts connections
and hands them off to the other process. It needs to run as
Previously Noah L. Meyerhans wrote:
> The IP address, obviously, has been replaced with x's here. I haven't
> ever seen the message before.
You should never get one.
> Might this be an attempt at something like that? Might this merely have been
> a packet that got horribly mangled somewhere on
Previously Philipp Schulte wrote:
> I am running Apache 1.3.9 and I am wondering, if this might be a
> security issue. There is always one Apache-process running as root.
That process doesn't process requests, it only accepts connections
and hands them off to the other process. It needs to run as
Previously Noah L. Meyerhans wrote:
> The IP address, obviously, has been replaced with x's here. I haven't
> ever seen the message before.
You should never get one.
> Might this be an attempt at something like that? Might this merely have been
> a packet that got horribly mangled somewhere on
Previously Wade Richards wrote:
> I'm fairly sure that this is "debian-illegal" way to do it, but I created
> a "firewall" script in /etc/init.d, and then the correct symlinks to that
> script from the RC directories. The files are:
> -rwxr-xr-x387 Nov 7 22:43 init.d/firewall*
> lrwxrwxrwx
Previously Wade Richards wrote:
> I'm fairly sure that this is "debian-illegal" way to do it, but I created
> a "firewall" script in /etc/init.d, and then the correct symlinks to that
> script from the RC directories. The files are:
> -rwxr-xr-x387 Nov 7 22:43 init.d/firewall*
> lrwxrwxrwx
Previously Micah Anderson wrote:
> I am getting a lot of entries in my logs with the following entries from
> ipchains, I can't quite figure out what port 3 is supposed to be.
These are ICMP packages, not IP. And you shouldn't be blocking ICMP..
Wichert.
--
__
Previously Micah Anderson wrote:
> I am getting a lot of entries in my logs with the following entries from
> ipchains, I can't quite figure out what port 3 is supposed to be.
These are ICMP packages, not IP. And you shouldn't be blocking ICMP..
Wichert.
--
_
Previously [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I got the following (alarming) messages on syslog:
This is becoming a FAQ.. it's a failed crack attempt.
Wichert.
--
/ Generally uninteresting signature - ignore at your convenience \
| [
Previously [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I got the following (alarming) messages on syslog:
This is becoming a FAQ.. it's a failed crack attempt.
Wichert.
--
/ Generally uninteresting signature - ignore at your convenience \
|
Previously Bob Bernstein wrote:
> Since this vulnerability is now "in the wild," so to speak, due to this
> very discussion, isn't it a good idea to make an announcement to the
> effect that at the very least fping should have its setuid root
> removed?
You might as well remove all suid bits from
Previously Bob Bernstein wrote:
> Since this vulnerability is now "in the wild," so to speak, due to this
> very discussion, isn't it a good idea to make an announcement to the
> effect that at the very least fping should have its setuid root
> removed?
You might as well remove all suid bits from
Previously thomas lakofski wrote:
> Since I've not had any response yet, I thought I'd give a demonstration of how
> nasty this is:
We're aware of it and looking into this at the moment, as well as
checking if there are other similar problems we might have missed.
Wichert.
--
___
Previously thomas lakofski wrote:
> Since I've not had any response yet, I thought I'd give a demonstration of how
> nasty this is:
We're aware of it and looking into this at the moment, as well as
checking if there are other similar problems we might have missed.
Wichert.
--
__
Previously Jeremy Gaddis wrote:
> And if you believe that, you're a fool.
I do believe that. It's a matter of knowing what you're doing and
selecting just the package you need.
Wichert.
--
/ Generally uninteresting signature -
Previously Jeremy Gaddis wrote:
> And if you believe that, you're a fool.
I do believe that. It's a matter of knowing what you're doing and
selecting just the package you need.
Wichert.
--
/ Generally uninteresting signature
Previously Ory Segal wrote:
> Are there any Debian-Oriented security hardening scripts out there ?
We don't need them :).
Wichert.
--
_
/ Nothing is fool-proof to a sufficiently talented fool \
| [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Previously Ory Segal wrote:
> Are there any Debian-Oriented security hardening scripts out there ?
We don't need them :).
Wichert.
--
_
/ Nothing is fool-proof to a sufficiently talented fool \
| [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Previously Jacob Kuntz wrote:
> that's sun rpc portmapper. unless your site uses nfs, you don't need it.
> here's how you make it go away:
There are lots more things then NFS that use sun RPC. NIS comes
to mind for example.
Wichert.
--
Previously Jacob Kuntz wrote:
> that's sun rpc portmapper. unless your site uses nfs, you don't need it.
> here's how you make it go away:
There are lots more things then NFS that use sun RPC. NIS comes
to mind for example.
Wichert.
--
___
Previously Joakim Friberg wrote:
> Do any one have an example of a script/deamon fo eliminating unecessary
> processes, like if an user starts to clone prosesses.
It's not possible to decide which processes are unecessary. Judging
by your reference to fork bombs you should probably look at resourc
Previously Joakim Friberg wrote:
> Do any one have an example of a script/deamon fo eliminating unecessary
> processes, like if an user starts to clone prosesses.
It's not possible to decide which processes are unecessary. Judging
by your reference to fork bombs you should probably look at resour
Previously Christian Kurz wrote:
> How long is dpkg-statoverries available for debian?
Couple of weeks. There is also the slight fact that the currently
shipped version is subtly broken :(. It's still cool though!
Wichert.
--
Previously Christian Kurz wrote:
> How long is dpkg-statoverries available for debian?
Couple of weeks. There is also the slight fact that the currently
shipped version is subtly broken :(. It's still cool though!
Wichert.
--
Previously Javier Fernandez-Sanguino Pe?a wrote:
> I do not know if other developers are aware, but there is a nice
> Security HOWTO available in
> http://joker.rhwd.de/doc/Securing-Debian-HOWTO and made by Alexander
> Reelsen (which I am sending this to in case he is not on the list).
A quick pe
Previously Javier Fernandez-Sanguino Pe?a wrote:
> I do not know if other developers are aware, but there is a nice
> Security HOWTO available in
> http://joker.rhwd.de/doc/Securing-Debian-HOWTO and made by Alexander
> Reelsen (which I am sending this to in case he is not on the list).
A quick p
Previously Jamie Heilman wrote:
> The libnns-ldap 122-1 update made it into r1 without ever having an
> official Security Alert announcement, I dunno how big of a deal this is,
> but I figured I should dredge it up incase it needed be addressed
> officially. Anyone?
I know, it's on the list of th
Previously Jamie Heilman wrote:
> The libnns-ldap 122-1 update made it into r1 without ever having an
> official Security Alert announcement, I dunno how big of a deal this is,
> but I figured I should dredge it up incase it needed be addressed
> officially. Anyone?
I know, it's on the list of t
Previously Christian Hammers wrote:
> Shouldn't such a cookie be in /var/state, /var/run or at least /tmp?
> I really wouldn't like such a think in my *root*!
It's a user thing, not a system-wide thing. It's much like the
.Xauthority file, except less sane.
Wichert.
--
__
Previously Virginie-ML wrote:
> I've found a curious hidden file at the root of my system:
> It looks like an esound thing but its content is very strange for me and
> I don't like the _auth in its name...
It's a cookie used by esound to authorize clients to connect to a
running esd process. Espe
Previously Christian Hammers wrote:
> Shouldn't such a cookie be in /var/state, /var/run or at least /tmp?
> I really wouldn't like such a think in my *root*!
It's a user thing, not a system-wide thing. It's much like the
.Xauthority file, except less sane.
Wichert.
--
_
Previously Virginie-ML wrote:
> I've found a curious hidden file at the root of my system:
> It looks like an esound thing but its content is very strange for me and
> I don't like the _auth in its name...
It's a cookie used by esound to authorize clients to connect to a
running esd process. Esp
FWIW, I backported the patch already and an advisory should appear
later today.
Wichert.
--
_
/ Nothing is fool-proof to a sufficiently talented fool \
| [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.liacs.nl/~wichert/
FWIW, I backported the patch already and an advisory should appear
later today.
Wichert.
--
_
/ Nothing is fool-proof to a sufficiently talented fool \
| [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.liacs.nl/~wichert
Previously André Dahlqvist wrote:
> Keith Owens, the author of modutils, just sent this security annoucement
> to the linux-kernel mailing list:
Looking into this I found some nice issues:
1. potato is not vulnerable
2. the patch from Keith is wrong
I'll have fix for woody later today.
Wichert.
Previously André Dahlqvist wrote:
> Keith Owens, the author of modutils, just sent this security annoucement
> to the linux-kernel mailing list:
Looking into this I found some nice issues:
1. potato is not vulnerable
2. the patch from Keith is wrong
I'll have fix for woody later today.
Wichert.
Previously Jean-Marc Boursot wrote:
> Debian 2.2 IS vulnerable to the following DOS reported by Fabio
> Pietrosanti (naif) <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> in bugtraq:
Yes, we know. I have a patch no as well so we should have this
fixed soon.
Wichert.
--
__
Previously Jean-Marc Boursot wrote:
> Debian 2.2 IS vulnerable to the following DOS reported by Fabio
> Pietrosanti (naif) <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> in bugtraq:
Yes, we know. I have a patch no as well so we should have this
fixed soon.
Wichert.
--
_
Previously Jamie Heilman wrote:
> depending on your needs this will cover gdm or not, here's what I use:
> auth requisite pam_nologin.so
> auth required pam_env.so
> auth required pam_ldap.so
> account required pam_ldap.so
> session required pam_unix.so
> password required
Previously Philippe BARNETCHE wrote:
> It looks like xdm doesn't support pam.
Right, xdm can't support PAM correctly unfortunately without
breaking binary compatibility with xdm modules..
> I can't get pam_ldap working (either with login or gdm or kdm) while it's
> running great on other distrib
Previously Jamie Heilman wrote:
> depending on your needs this will cover gdm or not, here's what I use:
> auth requisite pam_nologin.so
> auth required pam_env.so
> auth required pam_ldap.so
> account required pam_ldap.so
> session required pam_unix.so
> password required
Previously Philippe BARNETCHE wrote:
> It looks like xdm doesn't support pam.
Right, xdm can't support PAM correctly unfortunately without
breaking binary compatibility with xdm modules..
> I can't get pam_ldap working (either with login or gdm or kdm) while it's
> running great on other distri
Previously Nick Phillips wrote:
> So a security update for a package which is usually in,
> say, non-US/non-free will appear on security.debian.org
> in the updates/non-free section, right?
Right.
> I presume nothing in apt or dselect will get confused by the
> package appearing to be in two dif
Previously Nick Phillips wrote:
> There doesn't appear to be the directory structure for this
> on security.debian.org - what am I missing?
Nothing, security.debian.org is in a non-US locatoin and mirroring
is not encouraged, so we don't need a seperate non-US directory.
Wichert.
--
Previously Nick Phillips wrote:
> So, now that we're clear(er), where do security updates for
> non-US packages go???
Same location as security updates for all other packages.
Wichert.
--
/ Generally uninteresting signature -
Previously Nick Phillips wrote:
> So a security update for a package which is usually in,
> say, non-US/non-free will appear on security.debian.org
> in the updates/non-free section, right?
Right.
> I presume nothing in apt or dselect will get confused by the
> package appearing to be in two di
Previously Nick Phillips wrote:
> There doesn't appear to be the directory structure for this
> on security.debian.org - what am I missing?
Nothing, security.debian.org is in a non-US locatoin and mirroring
is not encouraged, so we don't need a seperate non-US directory.
Wichert.
--
___
Previously Nick Phillips wrote:
> So, now that we're clear(er), where do security updates for
> non-US packages go???
Same location as security updates for all other packages.
Wichert.
--
/ Generally uninteresting signature -
Previously Florian Friesdorf wrote:
> What are the differences between
> http://http.us.debian.org/debian dists/potato-proposed-updates/
> and
> http://security.debian.org potato/updates main contrib non-free
> ?
One is updates that might make it into a revision of potato,
and the other are veri
Previously Florian Friesdorf wrote:
> What are the differences between
> http://http.us.debian.org/debian dists/potato-proposed-updates/
> and
> http://security.debian.org potato/updates main contrib non-free
> ?
One is updates that might make it into a revision of potato,
and the other are ver
Previously Mikko Kilpikoski wrote:
> I'm unable to reach security.debian.org or nonus.debian.org
> and can't find a mirror for security.debian.org.
FYI, security.debian.org will move to another location soon that
has a more stable connection.
Wichert.
--
__
Previously Mikko Kilpikoski wrote:
> I'm unable to reach security.debian.org or nonus.debian.org
> and can't find a mirror for security.debian.org.
FYI, security.debian.org will move to another location soon that
has a more stable connection.
Wichert.
--
_
Previously Sergio Brandano wrote:
> ... by the way, what is nterm? there are no docs on that too.
A quick search (10 second) on google reveals that is might be a nroff
based printing service, used on AIX at least.
Wichert.
--
Previously Sergio Brandano wrote:
> There is no documentation on the nterm service, including its purpose
> and security issues. I first reported the fact at the genesis of the
> GNOME project, about two years ago. I hope this time there will be
> a public answer.
It has nothing to do with nte
Previously Sergio Brandano wrote:
> ... by the way, what is nterm? there are no docs on that too.
A quick search (10 second) on google reveals that is might be a nroff
based printing service, used on AIX at least.
Wichert.
--
Previously Sergio Brandano wrote:
> There is no documentation on the nterm service, including its purpose
> and security issues. I first reported the fact at the genesis of the
> GNOME project, about two years ago. I hope this time there will be
> a public answer.
It has nothing to do with nt
Previously ironhand wrote:
> I have a lame-type question. I'm supposed to install potato on a
> machine in my school. It will be supporting masqurade to allow other
> computers to use internet connection. I'm asking You people, about
> well known holes in system.
Just look at http://security.debia
Previously ironhand wrote:
> I have a lame-type question. I'm supposed to install potato on a
> machine in my school. It will be supporting masqurade to allow other
> computers to use internet connection. I'm asking You people, about
> well known holes in system.
Just look at http://security.debi
Previously [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Does anyone know a firewall running under Debian/woody with
> Kernel 2.4.0-test6 ?
test6 is broken, use test7. For a production firewall I would
use 2.2.17 though, that shouls be more stable.
Wichert.
--
___
Previously [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Does anyone know a firewall running under Debian/woody with
> Kernel 2.4.0-test6 ?
test6 is broken, use test7. For a production firewall I would
use 2.2.17 though, that shouls be more stable.
Wichert.
--
__
Previously Allen Ahoffman wrote:
> We have a system which was hacked.
Cracked you mean.
> We know the guy replaced netstat, ls, ps, and some other stuff, set up
> camp in /tmp, uses a hacked telnetd on a higher port, and gains root
> access, but we are looking for the hacks that get people in wi
Previously Koala wrote:
> I was wondering if someone could point to a vast area about ipchains.
Heh, I know there is rusty's unreliable guide to netfilter which is
a pretty good document imho, but it only works for netfilter which is
in the 2.4 kernels.
Anyway, can you confirm that what you want
Previously Koala wrote:
> I was wondering if someone could point to a vast area about ipchains.
Heh, I know there is rusty's unreliable guide to netfilter which is
a pretty good document imho, but it only works for netfilter which is
in the 2.4 kernels.
Anyway, can you confirm that what you want
Previously Alexander Hvostov wrote:
> It still needs to be fixed, and I'm glad someone decided to audit proftpd.
Who said proftpd was audited?
Wichert.
--
_
/ Generally uninteresting signature - ignore at your convenience \
| [
Previously Alexander Hvostov wrote:
> It still needs to be fixed, and I'm glad someone decided to audit proftpd.
Who said proftpd was audited?
Wichert.
--
_
/ Generally uninteresting signature - ignore at your convenience \
|
Previously Nathaniel McGowan wrote:
> Yup - i have exactly the same problem - but to add insult to injury, when i
> get the response from the server that says my e-mail address has not been
> recognised 10 of the 20 near matches it quotes are my exact address!
The trick might be to send an email f
Previously Nathaniel McGowan wrote:
> Yup - i have exactly the same problem - but to add insult to injury, when i
> get the response from the server that says my e-mail address has not been
> recognised 10 of the 20 near matches it quotes are my exact address!
The trick might be to send an email
Previously Alexander Hvostov wrote:
> So is root's password. ;)
Yes, but if it is enabled all users can use sysrq to kill a lock.
Also please realize using a root password to unlock a lock is dangerous,
since you never know if you are dealing with the real lock program
or a fake.
Wichert.
--
Previously Alexander Hvostov wrote:
> So is root's password. ;)
Yes, but if it is enabled all users can use sysrq to kill a lock.
Also please realize using a root password to unlock a lock is dangerous,
since you never know if you are dealing with the real lock program
or a fake.
Wichert.
--
Previously Christopher W. Curtis wrote:
> Is the reason for disabling SysRq sinply the same (ability to reboot,
> etc) or do you think there could be an exploitable condition with the
> information given?
SysRq is very good for killing a console lock such as vlock..
Wichert.
--
_
Previously Christopher W. Curtis wrote:
> Is the reason for disabling SysRq sinply the same (ability to reboot,
> etc) or do you think there could be an exploitable condition with the
> information given?
SysRq is very good for killing a console lock such as vlock..
Wichert.
--
Previously Guido Guenther wrote:
> According to upstream we can't hope that he will put portsentry under a
> license which debian considers as free in the near future so a free
> reimplementation would be great. Portsentry is a nice peace of software
> but it's missing some crucial features such as
Previously Alexander Hvostov wrote:
> Where might I find this?
http://www.msu.ru/pniam/pniam.html
ftp://ftp.nc.orc.ru/pub/Linux/pniam/pniam-0.02.tgz
Wichert.
--
/ Generally uninteresting signature - ignore at
Previously Guido Guenther wrote:
> According to upstream we can't hope that he will put portsentry under a
> license which debian considers as free in the near future so a free
> reimplementation would be great. Portsentry is a nice peace of software
> but it's missing some crucial features such a
Previously Alexander Hvostov wrote:
> Where might I find this?
http://www.msu.ru/pniam/pniam.html
ftp://ftp.nc.orc.ru/pub/Linux/pniam/pniam-0.02.tgz
Wichert.
--
/ Generally uninteresting signature - ignore at
Previously Alexander Hvostov wrote:
> I have a better idea: an integrated 'user' command, which uses plugins to
> access the actual database server (like PAM, but for writing to the
> database rather than reading from it), and performs any of several
> functions.
PNIAM might alreadyh do this, I ha
Previously Thomas Guettler wrote:
> I am in the same position. I have got some time left which
> I could spent in an opensource project. Nearly all
> things I dream of are already working.
A good free reimplementation of portsentry is something I would really
like to see. Right now portsentry wor
Previously Alexander Hvostov wrote:
> I have a better idea: an integrated 'user' command, which uses plugins to
> access the actual database server (like PAM, but for writing to the
> database rather than reading from it), and performs any of several
> functions.
PNIAM might alreadyh do this, I h
Previously Thomas Guettler wrote:
> I am in the same position. I have got some time left which
> I could spent in an opensource project. Nearly all
> things I dream of are already working.
A good free reimplementation of portsentry is something I would really
like to see. Right now portsentry wo
Previously Christian Hammers wrote:
> Is it right that there must exist a vulnerability in the server, too that
> allowes the attacker to execute code to exploit the capabilities bug?
> In other words, how severe is the urge to update the kernels on our
> production systems?
It indeed requires loc
Previously Ethan Benson wrote:
> it really does not need to go into dpkg, the proper way to add this is
> to alter suidmanager to immediatly print out such information when a
> binary is made suid.
Well, suidmanager functionality is scheduled to be merged into dpkg..
What should really be done is
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