Re: Recommend good IDS? was Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-04 Thread Alexander Reichle-Schmehl
Hi! john schrieb: > I'd be interested to hear some recommendations for IDS to run on > internet facing servers. Especially from the point of view of ease of > installation, ease of maintenance, quality of the tool, and ability to > have it deliver really useful information to the admin. I've used

Re: Recommend good IDS? was Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-03 Thread Nicolas GRENECHE
Hi, If you run large nuber of hosts, i suggest samhain. You have many features builtin (monitoring of files, system.map altering, suid bits, appending only on log files etc.). It works on client server model (a server who centralize hosts integrity database). Communications are secure (AES for ci

Re: Recommend good IDS? was Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-03 Thread Jeremy Melanson
I really like OSSEC. It's licensed under GPL V3. The agent runs on multiple platforms. It's easy to install, relatively easy to configure. The agent is a self-contained HIDS, rootkit detector, log and file monitor. It can also decode Snort, Cisco PIX/ASA, IPTables, and a a whole lot of other logs.

Re: Recommend good IDS? was Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-03 Thread Nikolai Lusan
On Wed, 2009-06-03 at 08:53 -0700, john wrote: > On Tue, Jun 2, 2009 at 4:45 PM, Josh Lauricha wrote: > > I'm surprised more people aren't running tripwire or other IDS. > I'd be interested to hear some recommendations for IDS to run on > internet facing servers. Especially from the point of view

Re: Recommend good IDS? was Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-03 Thread Izak Burger
On Wed, Jun 3, 2009 at 5:53 PM, john wrote: > I'd be interested to hear some recommendations for IDS to run on > internet facing servers. Especially from the point of view of ease of > installation, ease of maintenance, quality of the tool, and ability to > have it deliver really useful informatio

Re: Recommend good IDS? was Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-03 Thread Rick Moen
Quoting Boyd Stephen Smith Jr. (b...@iguanasuicide.net): > I inherited a tripwire installation at some point. It was one mail message > per day (and if you didn't get that message you knew something was wrong). > > It required a bit of tuning to not report errors regularly, but once I spent >

Re: Recommend good IDS? was Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-03 Thread Steven Brunasso
Remember, that a HIDS (host IDS) is just a detective control on the host. It shows that you have been hacked, you will probably want a good NIDS (network IDS) to see what attacks are being attempted over the wire. HIDS is good to quickly detect a compromise... http://sourceforge.net/proj

Re: Recommend good IDS? was Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-03 Thread Boyd Stephen Smith Jr.
In <2be970b50906030853t29dfb90atd60089611f98e...@mail.gmail.com>, john wrote: >On Tue, Jun 2, 2009 at 4:45 PM, Josh Lauricha wrote: >> I'm surprised more people aren't running tripwire or other IDS. > >I'd be interested to hear some recommendations for IDS to run on >internet facing servers. I i

Recommend good IDS? was Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-03 Thread john
On Tue, Jun 2, 2009 at 4:45 PM, Josh Lauricha wrote: > I'm surprised more people aren't running tripwire or other IDS. I'd be interested to hear some recommendations for IDS to run on internet facing servers. Especially from the point of view of ease of installation, ease of maintenance, quality

Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-02 Thread Josh Lauricha
I'm surprised more people aren't running tripwire or other IDS. On Tue, Jun 2, 2009 at 1:37 PM, Guntram Trebs wrote: > Hello, > > there are few chances of replacing sshd without being root. In your place i > would install every server new. > > I think, he spied out passwords and maybe got root-Pa

Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-02 Thread Guntram Trebs
Hello, there are few chances of replacing sshd without being root. In your place i would install every server new. I think, he spied out passwords and maybe got root-Passwords in this way. Possibly he has even accessed servers where you didn't find him and left backdoors there. (manipulation

Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-02 Thread Izak Burger
On Tue, Jun 2, 2009 at 6:42 PM, Wade Richards wrote: > Don't obsess on root access.  Any unauthorized use is a problem. You are right of course. Right after I sent my message saying that "perhaps the machine hasn't been exploited yet" I realised how wrong such a view is. Someone gained access to

Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-02 Thread Wade Richards
Although it's worse if an attacker has root, don't think that just because the attacker doesn't have root, it's no big deal. If an attacker can run (even as an ordinary user) unauthorized software on your machine, then your machine may be part of a botnet. And having unauthorized user access to a

Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-02 Thread Johann Spies
On Mon, Jun 01, 2009 at 07:23:27AM -0400, Michael Stone wrote: > Yes, that's a typical location for intruders to drop files. Easiest > thing to do is reinstall after thinking about how the compromise may > have occurred. (Did you update regularly, including kernel updates? Did > all accounts

Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-02 Thread Guntram Trebs
Izak Burger schrieb: On Mon, Jun 1, 2009 at 12:26 PM, Vladislav Kurz I agree, chances are the box hasn't been exploited just yet, but I would be worried about just how he got that file there in the first place. We know that directory is world writable, so it could have been written by anythin

Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-01 Thread Izak Burger
On Mon, Jun 1, 2009 at 12:26 PM, Vladislav Kurz wrote: > Well, this really looks suspicious. Look for unexpected processes running, > open ports, etc. Directory /dev/shm/ is world-writable like /tmp, so chances > are that the attacker did not gain root yet. But he might have shell > listening on s

Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-01 Thread Michael Stone
On Mon, Jun 01, 2009 at 12:31:04PM +0100, Marcin Owsiany wrote: Note that this seems to be a simple "expect(1)" script which runs a shell. Not necessarily an indication of anything apart from a possible attacker trying to exploit something using expect. It's also an indication that the attacker

Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-01 Thread Marcin Owsiany
On Mon, Jun 01, 2009 at 12:26:49PM +0200, Vladislav Kurz wrote: > On Monday 01 of June 2009, Johann Spies wrote: > > spawn /bin/bash > > interact Note that this seems to be a simple "expect(1)" script which runs a shell. Not necessarily an indication of anything apart from a possible attacker tryi

Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-01 Thread Michael Stone
On Mon, Jun 01, 2009 at 10:46:54AM +0200, Johann Spies wrote: I am a bit worried that my computer have been compromised. ... I think the last three lines are not problematic but in /dev/shm/r I found: spawn /bin/bash interact Do I have reason to be worried? Yes, that's a typical loc

Re: /dev/shm/r?

2009-06-01 Thread Vladislav Kurz
On Monday 01 of June 2009, Johann Spies wrote: > I am a bit worried that my computer have been compromised. > > Rkhunter reported: > > [10:35:47] Warning: Suspicious file types found in /dev: > [10:35:47] /dev/shm/r: ASCII text > [10:35:48] Checking for hidden

/dev/shm/r?

2009-06-01 Thread Johann Spies
I am a bit worried that my computer have been compromised. Rkhunter reported: [10:35:47] Warning: Suspicious file types found in /dev: [10:35:47] /dev/shm/r: ASCII text [10:35:48] Checking for hidden files and directories [ Warning ] [10:35:48] Warning: Hidden directory found