On Mon, Oct 04, 2004 at 12:14:56PM -0400, Christian Hudon wrote:
Max Vozeler wrote:
The pppd in Debian appears to change privileges back to those of the
invoking user before calling the program specified in the pty option,
preventing normal users from controlling PPPOE connections like other
On Wed, 06 Oct 2004, Marco d'Itri wrote:
On Oct 06, Max Vozeler [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It would make it possible for /usr/sbin/pppoe to get rid of setuid root
and still work for unprivileged users. Marco, how does this look to you?
Would you consider including such an option in ppp?
I
On Wed, Oct 06, 2004 at 02:11:32PM +0200, Marco d'Itri wrote:
On Oct 06, Max Vozeler [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It would make it possible for /usr/sbin/pppoe to get rid of setuid root
and still work for unprivileged users. Marco, how does this look to you?
Would you consider including such
David F. Skoll wrote:
On Mon, 4 Oct 2004, Martin Schulze wrote:
There are reasons users install it setuid / setgid, and these installations
are vulnerable.
I disagree. There is absolutely *no* reason to install rp-pppoe
setuid-root. It is normally invoked by pppd, and pppd must be
Hi David,
On Mon, Oct 04, 2004 at 10:27:28AM -0400, David F. Skoll wrote:
On Mon, 4 Oct 2004, Martin Schulze wrote:
There are reasons users install it setuid / setgid, and these installations
are vulnerable.
I disagree. There is absolutely *no* reason to install rp-pppoe
setuid-root.
Max Vozeler wrote:
The pppd in Debian appears to change privileges back to those of the
invoking user before calling the program specified in the pty option,
preventing normal users from controlling PPPOE connections like other
normal PPP connections.
If this is really the case, then maybe the
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