Re: Security trough paranoia

2001-04-02 Thread Dimitri Maziuk
On Fri, Mar 30, 2001 at 05:13:12PM -0800, Ben Gertzfield wrote: ... How exactly are you proposing to keep change shadow passwords back and forth from MD5 without having the user re-input every password? This is Very Hard to Do. :) Well, it seems I didn't think of How Things Work and the

Re: Security trough paranoia

2001-03-31 Thread Ilya Martynov
DM My main objection is to having defaults that are incompatible with DM other unices and linux already has plenty of those. You can't satisfy everybode's defaults. For example FreeBSD already have md5 as default. -- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- |

Security trough paranoia

2001-03-30 Thread DrPablo
Hello! I'm a Debian user since its hamm release. Some of the things that always woried me (and I guess, a couple of other users) is the lack of security hardening in the Debian distro. This email is to report some idea I've got sometime ago. I have already posted this idea to

Re: Security trough paranoia

2001-03-30 Thread Dimitri Maziuk
On Fri, Mar 30, 2001 at 05:46:42PM -0300, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: * everything must be recompiled under stackguard (http://www.immunix.org/stackguard.html). This would prevent the famous stack smashing attack. Shirley not everything! * glibc must be patched

Re: Security trough paranoia

2001-03-30 Thread Steve Langasek
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hi Dimitri, On Fri, 30 Mar 2001, Dimitri Maziuk wrote: * PAM must come with md5 hash enabled by default. No. Think heterogeneous networks. Apologies if I've missed something glaringly obvious, but how does having a heterogeneous network

Re: Security trough paranoia

2001-03-30 Thread Steve Langasek
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Fri, 30 Mar 2001, Steve Langasek wrote: Which default is really going to better the Debian community as a whole? ObCorrection: 'Which default is really going to better serve the Debian community as a whole?' I have no illusions that using

Re: Security trough paranoia

2001-03-30 Thread Dimitri Maziuk
On Fri, Mar 30, 2001 at 05:03:18PM -0600, Steve Langasek wrote: ... Since the use of md5 primarily affects updates made to the local password/shadow file, the only scenarios where this even becomes a problem are when using NIS, or when distributing copies of the same password/shadow file to

Re: Security trough paranoia

2001-03-30 Thread David Spreen
Hi there, the lids patch is part of the unstable distribution, (lids-2.2.18 lids-2.4.1). If you want to build a secure kernel-image for debian feel free to do it. On the LIDS-homepage there are patches including stealth and openwall4 patch. If If you wish them to be packaged I think I can do.

Re: Security trough paranoia

2001-03-30 Thread Ben Gertzfield
Dimitri == Dimitri Maziuk [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Dimitri Ok, I'll buy that. Hopefully, (package ?) install script Dimitri will ask me if I want md5 passwords and will tell me to Dimitri run /usr/sbin/md5config if I change my mind later (the Dimitri way it is done with shadow).

Re: Security trough paranoia

2001-03-30 Thread Chad Miller
Dimitri == Dimitri Maziuk [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Dimitri Ok, I'll buy that. Hopefully, (package ?) install script Dimitri will ask me if I want md5 passwords and will tell me to Dimitri run /usr/sbin/md5config if I change my mind later (the Dimitri way it is done with

Re: Security trough paranoia

2001-03-30 Thread Joseph Carter
On Fri, Mar 30, 2001 at 10:54:00PM -0500, Chad Miller wrote: How exactly are you proposing to keep change shadow passwords back and forth from MD5 without having the user re-input every password? This is Very Hard to Do. :) ...and if it were easy, we wouldn't be considering MD5 as very