On 10/24/16 6:29 PM, Adam Roach wrote:
and -- as bz points out -- we don't want to throw an exception
here for spec compliance purposes.
Actually, what I wanted to say is that if we think all browsers should
implement some behavior here then we should get the spec changed to say
so. Shipping
On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 6:29 PM, Adam Roach wrote:
> I'm hearing general agreement that we think turning this off is the right
> thing to do; that maintaining compatibility with Chrome's behavior is
> important (since that's what existing code will presumably be tested
> against); and -- as bz po
I'm hearing general agreement that we think turning this off is the
right thing to do; that maintaining compatibility with Chrome's behavior
is important (since that's what existing code will presumably be tested
against); and -- as bz points out -- we don't want to throw an exception
here for
On 2016-10-24 4:14 AM, Gervase Markham wrote:
> On 22/10/16 18:12, Ehsan Akhgari wrote:
>> Have we considered doing something here to help the user when we block
>> this API? For example, we could check to see whether the site has a TLS
>> version
>
> If there were a reliable way to do this, HTT
While this doesn't definitively answer your question, it may provide some
insight:
We ran a survey of Chrome XP users (N=819) after Chrome's end of life
message was shown in the product (English only). The results showed:
-
About half the sample plan to continue using Chrome on XP without
This seems to assume facts not in evidence, namely that people will stop
using those
machines rather than just living with whatever the last version we updated
them to.
Do we have any data that shows that that's true?
-Ekr
On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 AM, Gervase Markham wrote:
> On 22/10/16
On Monday, October 24, 2016 at 3:35:20 AM UTC-7, keithga...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Monday, October 24, 2016 at 3:12:31 AM UTC-5, Gervase Markham wrote:
> > On 22/10/16 10:16, keithgallis...@gmail.com wrote:
> > > My concern is that by killing digital certificate updates and TLS
> > > updates, still
On 22/10/16 18:12, Ehsan Akhgari wrote:
> Have we considered doing something here to help the user when we block
> this API? For example, we could check to see whether the site has a TLS
> version
If there were a reliable way to do this, HTTPS Everywhere would be a
whole lot easier to write and
Hi everyone,
Here's the list of new issues found and filed by the Desktop Release QA
Team last week, *October 17**- October 21* (week 42).
Additional details on the team's priorities last week, as well as the
plans for the current week are available at:
https://public.etherpad-mozilla.or
On Monday, October 24, 2016 at 3:12:31 AM UTC-5, Gervase Markham wrote:
> On 22/10/16 10:16, keithgallis...@gmail.com wrote:
> > My concern is that by killing digital certificate updates and TLS
> > updates, still in use machines whose main purpose is Internet access
> > are essentially bricked.
>
On Saturday, October 22, 2016 at 4:27:32 AM UTC-5, Martin Thomson wrote:
> Yep, I just designated a relatives machine to recycling on that basis.
> I could have updated the OS, but they had other better options, so
> we're reclaiming the space. I know that neither option is that
> pleasant, but it
On Sat, Oct 22, 2016, at 09:38 PM, Richard Barnes wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 5:56 PM, Ehsan Akhgari
> wrote:
> > Since the proposal in the bug is adding [SecureContext] to
> > Navigator.geolocation, have we also collected telemetry around which
> > properties and methods are accessed? Since
On 22/10/16 18:12, Ehsan Akhgari wrote:
> Have we considered doing something here to help the user when we block
> this API? For example, we could check to see whether the site has a TLS
> version
If there were a reliable way to do this, HTTPS Everywhere would be a
whole lot easier to write and
On 22/10/16 10:16, keithgallis...@gmail.com wrote:
> My concern is that by killing digital certificate updates and TLS
> updates, still in use machines whose main purpose is Internet access
> are essentially bricked.
This is a feature, not a bug. If those machines shouldn't be on the
Internet, and
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