Re: Intent to ship: CSS subgrid

2019-10-18 Thread Tantek Çelik
Agreed with clarification. Declarative text/css stylesheets not restricted. Imperative new APIs (like Houdini APIs) should be restricted to secure contexts by default. Thanks, Tantek On Fri, Oct 18, 2019 at 4:53 PM Daniel Veditz wrote: > > On Fri, Oct 18, 2019 at 4:27 PM Tantek Çelik wrote: >> >

Re: Intent to ship: CSS subgrid

2019-10-18 Thread Daniel Veditz
On Fri, Oct 18, 2019 at 4:27 PM Tantek Çelik wrote: > Based on your reasoning, and our consistent intent emails and shipping > behavior, I think we should consider updating the blog post on this > matter regarding all CSS features (cc: annevk), or posting a separate > update post accordingly, usi

Re: Intent to ship: CSS subgrid

2019-10-18 Thread Tantek Çelik
Thanks Dan. I concur with the priorities, impacts, and conclusions you've outlined. In practice I believe 100% of the CSS features we have shipped (Intent to Implement/Ship emails) in the past year+ have been exposed to insecure contexts. Based on your reasoning, and our consistent intent emails

Re: PSA: Android test environments

2019-10-18 Thread Bobby Holley
This is a great summary, and reflects a ton of hard work over the past year to improve our mobile testing story and reduce our CI spend. Thanks gbrown and everyone else who helped make it happen! On Fri, Oct 18, 2019 at 11:52 AM Geoffrey Brown wrote: > The Android test environments used for cont

PSA: Android test environments

2019-10-18 Thread Geoffrey Brown
The Android test environments used for continuous integration have been through many changes over the last year or two; here's a review of what we have today. [1] Most of our Android tests run on emulators. Some run on hardware: real phones. Our Android hardware tests run on physical devices -- M

Re: Intent to ship: CSS subgrid

2019-10-18 Thread Daniel Veditz
>From my (personal) security-team perspective this is a fine pragmatic approach. Our overriding primary concern is whether exposing these new CSS features over insecure transport puts our users at additional risk. I don't see any meaningful privacy exposure here since these new features will be in

Re: [blink-dev] Re: What to do about scroll anchoring?

2019-10-18 Thread Chris Harrelson
Hi, Another quick update: Emilio, Navid, Nick, Stefan and I met today and discussed which issues are important to fix and why. We now have a list of spec issues, and WPT tests to fix that are Chromium bugs, that should substantially improve interop. Nick and Stefan will take on the work to fix the

Intent to prototype: JavaScript weak references

2019-10-18 Thread Jonathan Coppeard
Summary: This feature allows developers to create weak references to JavaScript objects. Finalizers are also provided that allow developers to perform actions when an object is garbage collected, without keeping that object alive. This is an advanced feature that is not expected to be widely u

Re: nsIPermissionManager Permission Isolation by OriginAttributes

2019-10-18 Thread pzuhlcke
On Thursday, 17 October 2019 15:31:50 UTC+2, Matthew N. wrote: > On 2019-10-16 7:15 a.m., Paul Zühlcke wrote: > > I plan to land a patch next week which will disable OriginAttribute > > stripping in the permission manager. This will result in private browsing > > windows and containers having isol

Intent to remove: nsStackFrame aka. `display: -moz-stack` and related features

2019-10-18 Thread Tim Nguyen
Hi folks, I’m planning to remove nsStackFrame in bug 1576946 [0]. This is part of a larger effort to make the browser stop using XUL layouts and align on more standard CSS layouts such as CSS grid or flexbox instead. The removal is targeted for Firefox 72. The removal includes these two non web-e