Re: How to access new security newsgroup

2006-03-10 Thread Mike Beltzner
I should learn to try things out before I ask silly questions. Changing my setup so that Thunderbird uses SSL seems to have resolved the issue. That said, it seems odd that *this* group needs SSL but others do not. Mike Beltzner wrote: I've been seeing this as well. Dave? Any suggestions? Does

Re: How to access new security newsgroup

2006-03-10 Thread Mike Beltzner
I've been seeing this as well. Dave? Any suggestions? Does this group require SSL or something? cheers, mike On 2/28/06, Doug Ludy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > For some reason I have been unable to transition from the > netscape.public.security newsgroup to mozilla.dev.security. When I try > to

Re: references to trusted objects from untrusted contexts

2006-03-10 Thread Brendan Eich
Brendan Eich wrote: 2. SpiderMonkey reflects __proto__ and __parent__ for all objects, again using per-property getter and (for __parent__) setter Oops, I meant "(for __proto__)" before "setter" above -- __parent__ is read-only. This informal write-up contains some boss-level browse

Re: references to trusted objects from untrusted contexts

2006-03-10 Thread Monica Chew
Whoops, I guess that's just another way to put what you were saying. The proxy model could emulate Linux the kernel's copy_to_user and copy_from_user, but that leads to another question -- how do you ensure you're using the proxy correctly, and not accidentally passing in references. On 3/10/06,

Re: references to trusted objects from untrusted contexts

2006-03-10 Thread Monica Chew
Is it easier (or more desirable) to make a function that clones a trusted object, but changes the type so that the sandbox can't reference trusted APIs from the clone? Or, if the object is a function, to make it so the sandbox can't introspect on the function? On 3/10/06, Fritz Schneider <[EMAIL

Re: Security capabilities (enablePrivilege, etc)

2006-03-10 Thread Ka-Ping Yee
> We should scrap all this and do something better. I'm really glad to see that there's interest in a new and better design. > One thought I had the other week is to enable privileges implicitly > based on "latent trust": site has good CA-signed cert, you've connected > with SSL, you've got a pas

Re: references to trusted objects from untrusted contexts

2006-03-10 Thread Brendan Eich
Fritz Schneider wrote: This direction of access (untrusted is handed a "trusted" object by trusted code) is not safe. Then it sounds like it is the case that there is no possible way to safely expose an interface to code in a sandbox? We *think* we've secured the paths in t

How to access new security newsgroup

2006-03-10 Thread Doug Ludy
For some reason I have been unable to transition from the netscape.public.security newsgroup to mozilla.dev.security. When I try to retrieve messages from news.mozilla.org via port 119, I get a message at bottom of the Thunderbird screen saying "There are no new messages on the server." So far

generation of X.509 certificate

2006-03-10 Thread majorsoul
Hi, I would like to generate an X.509 certificate singed with PKCS#1v2.1 PSS scheme. Can anyone recommend a tool for that? Can anyone send me an exmaple x.509 singed by this scheme? -- View this message in context: http://www.nabble.com/generation-of-X.509-certificate-t1192097.html#a3142100 Se

Re: references to trusted objects from untrusted contexts

2006-03-10 Thread Brendan Eich
Fritz Schneider wrote: BTW, with respect to this statement: This direction of access (untrusted is handed a "trusted" object by trusted code) is not safe. Is this due to bugs or policy? That is, in the absence of bugs in this area, would this direction be safe? There are a few

Mystery Mail

2006-03-10 Thread Francis Dewitte
Londerzeel, Belgium, 3rd of March 2006 Dear sirs, I am a novellist and I'm writing a new book in which I'm referring on e-mail traffic. I'd like to ask you if it's is technically possible to receive an e-mail of which the source-code is not mentioning the date of release or a date of release

Re: Security capabilities (enablePrivilege, etc)

2006-03-10 Thread Brendan Eich
Boris Zbarsky wrote: Brendan Eich wrote: One thought I had the other week is to enable privileges implicitly based on "latent trust": site has good CA-signed cert, you've connected with SSL, you've got a password saved for this site, you are logged in. Such a site could have some awesome pow

Re: references to trusted objects from untrusted contexts

2006-03-10 Thread Brendan Eich
Boris Zbarsky wrote: In this case, I think we do have an answer, though: "Someone found a situation where an object and its __proto__ were in different trust domains, and our policy is to not allow access to things from a different trust domain, so we need to check when getting the __proto__.

Re: references to trusted objects from untrusted contexts

2006-03-10 Thread Fritz Schneider
In case this was too verbose, I'll summarize: I'm suggesting that many applications that require cross-context communication might be solved with the combination of: (1) easy object (de)serialization to/from strings and (2) a proxy object that safely passes strings across contexts (via a proxy mod

Re: Security capabilities (enablePrivilege, etc)

2006-03-10 Thread Boris Zbarsky
Brendan Eich wrote: The better course in my view is to take charge of our destiny. That would be preferred (though we may need a backwards-compat shim for the three or four capabilities we support now). One thought I had the other week is to enable privileges implicitly based on "latent tru

Re: references to trusted objects from untrusted contexts

2006-03-10 Thread Boris Zbarsky
Fritz Schneider wrote: Doesn't seem to be able to (I get a security exception accessing .__proto__ on the privileged object). That's because of one of those JS-level checks (JS calls the hook, the CAPS code implements it). We check __proto__, __parent__, .constructor, and scripted getter or set