Hi Gerv,
Gervase Markham wrote:
Just to be clear: They are not _intended_ to cost $1000/year upwards;
But which I predicted a while ago...As suggested previously, this is
mostly a marketing ploy, since the EV procedures can be performed with
or without a CA/Browser forum. I guess, the prices
Certificates with subjectAltName extensions should be able to
replace wild card certificates, the question is what checks should
be applied to hostnames?
Most banks and other large entities have a list of hostnames as long
as my arm for load balancing and other valid reasons, most often
Ben Bucksch wrote:
How about reading the guidelines?
I did read it! Thorough and multiple times...trust me on that one...
They are public now. You work at a CA, don't you think it would be
helpful? You even protest that you cannot participate in CABForum, but
didn't read what it's about?
I'd like to eliminate the nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckSameOriginPrincipal in
favor of nsIPrincipal::Subsumes and nsIPrincipal::Equals. Usually we want a
Subsumes() check where we currently do CheckSameOriginPrincipal.
As things stand, nsPrincipal::Equals() already calls
Heikki Toivonen wrote:
Nelson B wrote:
beltzner wrote:
On 2/1/07, Gervase Markham [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Not to my knowledge. Such a thing would be fantastic!
What I was able to offer the W3C was:
http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/wiki/NoteMozillaCertificateValidationErrors
But if someone
