Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

2007-02-26 Thread Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)
Ben Bucksch wrote: Nelson Bolyard wrote: A contract would probably have commitments both ways, implied if not explicit. Is that a bad thing? Yes. We don't have *legal* control to yank roots anymore, only for the reasons explicit in the contract. Right now, it's just a practical prob

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

2007-02-26 Thread Ben Bucksch
Nelson Bolyard wrote: A contract would probably have commitments both ways, implied if not explicit. Is that a bad thing? Yes. We don't have *legal* control to yank roots anymore, only for the reasons explicit in the contract. Right now, it's just a practical problem. For example, i

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

2007-02-26 Thread Ben Bucksch
Gervase Markham wrote: - Mozilla writes loads of code to detect each different type of CA certificate and make sure that NSS knows what level it corresponds to (or are we doing that bit by asking the CAs to include new OIDs?) YES! Eddy explicitly said that. My "do this all ourselves" was just

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

2007-02-26 Thread Ben Bucksch
Nelson Bolyard wrote: Gervase Markham wrote: Ben Bucksch wrote: Actually, not even that is necessary. Classes each have their own root cert, so we can simply match root certs to level in our software, using a list that is just as hardcoded as our root certs, and matches the assigned lev