Re: Return of i18n attacks with the help of wildcard certificates

2009-03-04 Thread Boris Zbarsky
Florian Weimer wrote: Most users are not subject to MITM attacks This may or may not be true given the prevalence of wireless networks out there... we've had a number of reports of in-the-wild MITM attacks by wireless network operators. but they do receive all kinds of URL lures. Yes,

Re: Return of i18n attacks with the help of wildcard certificates

2009-03-04 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 03/04/2009 03:36 PM, Boris Zbarsky: Florian Weimer wrote: Most users are not subject to MITM attacks This may or may not be true given the prevalence of wireless networks out there... we've had a number of reports of in-the-wild MITM attacks by wireless network operators. Yes, many

Re: Return of i18n attacks with the help of wildcard certificates

2009-03-04 Thread Jean-Marc Desperrier
Eddy Nigg wrote: [...] When do we expect SSL? On submit or on password fields in a form[...] IF page contains form AND form contains password field THEN flash insecure form warning Could be done. But there would better be a cross browser agreement on this. And coupled with a way to offer

Re: Return of i18n attacks with the help of wildcard certificates

2009-03-04 Thread Johnathan Nightingale
On 4-Mar-09, at 8:36 AM, Boris Zbarsky wrote: Florian Weimer wrote: Most users are not subject to MITM attacks This may or may not be true given the prevalence of wireless networks out there... we've had a number of reports of in-the-wild MITM attacks by wireless network operators.

Re: Return of i18n attacks with the help of wildcard certificates

2009-03-04 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 03/04/2009 04:18 PM, Jean-Marc Desperrier: Eddy Nigg wrote: [...] When do we expect SSL? On submit or on password fields in a form[...] IF page contains form AND form contains password field THEN flash insecure form warning Could be done. But there would better be a cross browser

Re: Return of i18n attacks with the help of wildcard certificates

2009-03-04 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 03/04/2009 04:28 PM, Johnathan Nightingale: no website can spoof the EV appearance of the site identity button and, with the ssl_domain_display pref set to non-zero, (and appropriate care given to IDN issues), they can't for regular SSL either. Right, and I'm extremely glad that we are

Re: Return of i18n attacks with the help of wildcard certificates

2009-03-04 Thread Johnathan Nightingale
This kind of thing? https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/8128 On 4-Mar-09, at 9:42 AM, Eddy Nigg wrote: On 03/04/2009 04:28 PM, Johnathan Nightingale: no website can spoof the EV appearance of the site identity button and, with the ssl_domain_display pref set to non-zero, (and

Re: Return of i18n attacks with the help of wildcard certificates

2009-03-04 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 03/04/2009 04:48 PM, Johnathan Nightingale: This kind of thing? https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/8128 It looks nice! I think it should also turn red if the starting page is unsecured, not only the landing page, but technically this would not be correct. However I'd fee