There's been much previous discussion about how tough Mozilla
should be on CAs. especially in the wildcard cert area. I'd
like to suggest raising the standards in private browsing mode.
If, in private browsing mode, Mozilla can detect a MITM attack,
the user should be warned with a high-visibility warning.
This includes any cert in the chain with a wildcard bigger than
one second-level domain. The base list of CAs from Mozilla
used in this mode may be shorter than the main list. Any
CAs added locally, if allowed at all, should produce a warning.
So, if a corporate or school firewall is listening in, the
user is informed. This is consistent with Mozilla's
"work for mankind, not the man" policy.
John Nagle
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