Re: my research and documentation on capabilities.policy

2008-10-09 Thread Michael Vincent van Rantwijk, MultiZilla
Boris Zbarsky wrote: > Michael Vincent van Rantwijk, MultiZilla wrote: >> Right, so the properties that should be checked will still be checked, >> just to be sure nobody opens a can of worms. > > Yeah; the goal is to minimize the number of security checks while still >

Re: my research and documentation on capabilities.policy

2008-10-05 Thread Michael Vincent van Rantwijk, MultiZilla
Boris Zbarsky wrote: > Michael Vincent van Rantwijk, MultiZilla wrote: >> nsScriptSecurityManager is going to die? > > No, security checks on every single DOM property access are going to die. Right, so the properties that should be checked will still be checked, just to be sure

Re: my research and documentation on capabilities.policy

2008-10-04 Thread Michael Vincent van Rantwijk, MultiZilla
Boris Zbarsky wrote: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >> capabilities.policy..ClassID. source: >> http://mxr.mozilla.org/firefox2/source/caps/src/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp#2870 >> >> >> (I'm going to guess this can be used to kill things with a GUID-like >> number (IID? UUID?), most likely XPCOM comp

I think I found a security (related) bug so now what?

2007-08-23 Thread Michael Vincent van Rantwijk, MultiZilla
I think I found a security (related) bug so now what? Note: POC available. -- Michael Vincent van Rantwijk - MultiZilla Project Team Lead - XUL Boot Camp Staff member (ActiveState Training Partner) - iPhone Application Developer ___ dev-security