Re: Indicators for high-security features

2014-09-22 Thread fhw843
‎Hi Anne, Just to clarify, are you saying that effective in FF release ?? that ‎a document obtained via https will allow only https for all subsequent retrievals, images and js, etc. alike? To the larger discussion, I have 2 questions: 1) what is the specific message you'd like to convey to

Re: Indicators for high-security features

2014-09-22 Thread Anne van Kesteren
On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 1:47 PM, fhw...@gmail.com wrote: To the larger discussion, I have 2 questions: 1) what is the specific message you'd like to convey to the user ‎beyond what the simple lock icon provides. 2) What action do you intend the user to take based on seeing the new

Re: Short-lived certs

2014-09-22 Thread Gervase Markham
On 17/09/14 08:34, Kurt Roeckx wrote: A browser could perfectly reject a certificate that doesn't comply with the BR because the required OCSP URI is missing. It could. If such browsers existed, I agree it would have a negative effect on the likelihood of success of a short-lived certs plan.

Re: Short-lived certs

2014-09-22 Thread Jeremy . Rowley
I wouldn't be worried about a browser rejecting a cert that doesn't comply. Instead, I'd be worried about a qualified audit showing non-compliance. Although Mozilla might not care about that particular non-compliance, other browsers and partners might. Jeremy On 9/22/2014 8:36 AM, Gervase

Re: Indicators for high-security features

2014-09-22 Thread Chris Palmer
On Sat, Sep 20, 2014 at 1:10 AM, Anne van Kesteren ann...@annevk.nl wrote: My point is that UI indicators should reflect the reality of actual technical security boundaries. Unless we actually create a boundary, we shouldn't show that we have. So why do you show special UI for EV? For

Re: Indicators for high-security features

2014-09-22 Thread Chris Palmer
On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 5:56 AM, Henri Sivonen hsivo...@hsivonen.fi wrote: -- HTTP Strict Transport Security Yes, but I think this requirement shouldn't apply to subresources for the page to qualify, since top-level HSTS together with the No mixed content requirement mean that there's no

Re: SHA1

2014-09-22 Thread Kathleen Wilson
On 9/20/14, 2:35 PM, Eric Mill wrote: Spitting out dev console warnings is certainly a step forward. I'm not sure how the new dev console and Firebug interact, but I assume these added warnings would also show up in Firebug. I've noted to make sure the warnings show up in Firebug too.

Re: Indicators for high-security features

2014-09-22 Thread Ryan Sleevi
On Mon, September 22, 2014 11:23 am, Chris Palmer wrote: On Sat, Sep 20, 2014 at 1:10 AM, Anne van Kesteren ann...@annevk.nl wrote: ** Could the TACK key be the origin key? Is TACK still going anywhere? The mailing list suggests it's dead. But one could imagine it being resuscitated,