Re: ODP: Re: ODP: Re: KIR S.A. Root Inclusion Request

2014-09-30 Thread Matt Palmer
On Tue, Sep 30, 2014 at 01:17:22PM +0200, Certificates wrote: We are able to add some additional information to our CPS. In our opinion they should be more general than those in our explanations sent to you. More detailed information are placed in our internal procedures, which are checked

Re: ODP: Re: ODP: Re: KIR S.A. Root Inclusion Request

2014-09-30 Thread Kathleen Wilson
On 9/30/14, 1:40 PM, Matt Palmer wrote: The CPS is a Certification *Practice* Statement, not a Certification *Principles* Statement, and so I think it is reasonable to expect a description of the practices undertaken in issuing certificates. Matt is correct. BR section 8.2.1 says: The CA

Re: Client certs

2014-09-30 Thread fhw843
FIDO has its shortcomings, too, ‎and its users can be victims of phishing just as much as anyone else. All you need is the right inducement. For example...Passwords: Enter your password ‎now or your account will be frozen.Tokens: Enter the token code now or your account will be frozen.FIDO: Swipe

738 sites need their certs revoked

2014-09-30 Thread fhw843
According to SSL Pulse there are 738 sites that are vulnerable to Heartbleed: https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse/‎I just don't see how that can be tolerated. I'm assuming this data means we have sites that are presenting valid certs even though their private keys can be (and may have

Re: Client certs

2014-09-30 Thread Ryan Sleevi
On Tue, September 30, 2014 5:47 pm, fhw...@gmail.com wrote: FIDO has its shortcomings, too, ‎and its users can be victims of phishing just as much as anyone else. While a discussion of FIDO is best suited for the FIDO-specific groups, I would just highlight that you're mistaken in this. You