Co-incidentally, now that I've resolved that certificate problem, I am now
getting an issue connecting to
https://support.mozilla.org/1/firefox/40.0.3/Darwin/en-GB/clicktoplay
Secure Connection Failed
The connection to support.mozilla.org was interrupted while the page was
loading.
The page
On 9/16/15 1:13 AM, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
I think they can distribute the certificate for use by chrome and
internet explorer by using the group policy and so it's trivial for them
to distribute it to all the PCs. It might be a little bit more
complicated to do the same for Firefox.
We have
On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 02:51:28PM -0700, AnilG wrote:
>
> there's another issue blocking them for Firefox: Secure Connection Failed.
> The connection to wiki.mozilla.org was interrupted while the page was loading.
I wonder if firefox is using certificate pinning for
*.mozilla.org.
Kurt
On Thursday, 17 September 2015 08:02:21 UTC+10, David Keeler wrote:
> On 09/16/2015 02:51 PM, AnilG wrote:
> > Thanks Kathleen, those links might be helpful. I'm following them up in
> > Chrome because there's another issue blocking them for Firefox: Secure
> > Connection Failed. The connection
On 09/16/2015 02:51 PM, AnilG wrote:
> Thanks Kathleen, those links might be helpful. I'm following them up in
> Chrome because there's another issue blocking them for Firefox: Secure
> Connection Failed. The connection to wiki.mozilla.org was interrupted while
> the page was loading. The page
Yes, some hosts are pinned:
https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/manager/tools/PreloadedHPKPins.json
MITM is *always* bad and breaks the web. Modern browsers, especially
Firefox, have great features to protect the users and this is something
good. I'm pretty sure your students
On Thursday, 17 September 2015 09:27:15 UTC+10, s...@gmx.ch wrote:
> MITM is *always* bad and breaks the web. Modern browsers, especially
> Firefox, have great features to protect the users and this is something
> good. I'm pretty sure your students don't even know, that you attack
> their
Chrome has pinning too (in fact, Firefox's baseline list for HSTS and
pinning is extracted from there). AFAIK, Mozilla just didn't ask for
their domains to be pinned in Chromium. I don't think lack of support
for MITM attacks is a bug that should be addressed. It's a security
liability even when
On 9/15/2015 8:51 AM, Kathleen Wilson wrote [in part]:
> Yes. My plan is to publish the DRAFT of version 2.3 of the policy and
> list the changes, and then send a CA Communication to be sure they are
> all aware of the proposed changes and give them time to respond. So, it
> is very possible
It sounds as though the decision has been made, then: the code sign trust bit is out as are the pertinent certs. With Gerv giving a repeated "best regards" to the BR I don't think any other conclusion could be
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