Having seen the current (as of a few hours ago) wiki page, I have two
major things to add:
1. Unfortunately, not all https servers seem capable of doing
OCSP stapling, thus any viable requirements and mechanisms must allow
for:
1.1. Certificates that are used on servers that don't implement
OCSP
On 11/24/15 4:24 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
On 11/19/15 11:00 PM, h-k...@secom.co.jp wrote:
Dear Kathleen-san,
The updated CP for detailed descrition(the certificate subscriber
owns/controls) about domain verification for the section 3.2.7 is
attached on bugzilla.
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/
On 4/8/15 10:12 AM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
On 4/6/15 2:06 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
On 2/9/15 1:08 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa (KIR) S.A. has applied to include the "SZAFIR
ROOT CA" root certificate and enable all three trust bits.
The first discussion is here:
https
On 11/25/15 9:15 AM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
On 10/28/15 2:30 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
On 10/28/15 2:14 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
Google has blogged about this:
https://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2015/10/sustaining-digital-certificate-security.html
All,
We should discuss what ac
On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 12:15 PM, Kathleen Wilson
wrote:
>
>> 4) As of June 1st, 2016, all certificates issued by Symantec itself will
> be required to support Certificate Transparency and be published in CT.
>
Is this something Mozilla sees implemented as a technical measure within
Firefox, or
On 01/12/2015 19:26, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
On 4/8/15 10:12 AM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
On 4/6/15 2:06 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
On 2/9/15 1:08 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa (KIR) S.A. has applied to include the
"SZAFIR
ROOT CA" root certificate and enable all three tru
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