Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-10-06 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Fri, Oct 07, 2016 at 03:21:48AM +, Peter Gutmann wrote: > Kurt Roeckx writes: > > >This is why browsers have something like OneCRL, so that they actually do > >know about it and why Rob added that information to the bug tracker ( > >https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=906611#c2).

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-10-06 Thread Peter Gutmann
Kurt Roeckx writes: >This is why browsers have something like OneCRL, so that they actually do >know about it and why Rob added that information to the bug tracker ( >https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=906611#c2). That still doesn't necessarily answer the question, Google have their CR

Re: Incident Report - certificate with 'sb' as a SAN:dnsName

2016-10-06 Thread Peter Bowen
On Thu, Oct 6, 2016 at 7:33 AM, Peter Bowen wrote: > On Thu, Oct 6, 2016 at 7:29 AM, Rob Stradling > wrote: >> On 04/10/16 19:39, Peter Bowen wrote: >>> On Tue, Oct 4, 2016 at 6:29 AM, Rob Stradling >>> wrote: On 04/10/16 13:18, Nick Lamb wrote: > On Tuesday, 4 October 2016 11:14:01 U

Re: Include Symantec-brand Class 1 and Class 2 Root Certs

2016-10-06 Thread Peter Bowen
On Thu, Oct 6, 2016 at 3:57 PM, Richard Barnes wrote: > I seem to recall we had some discussion a while back about what criteria > should be applied to email CAs. Where did we end up on that? I don't believe anything was settled. There is one small item in the CA policy: "for a certificate to

Re: Include Symantec-brand Class 1 and Class 2 Root Certs

2016-10-06 Thread Richard Barnes
On Thu, Oct 6, 2016 at 12:09 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote: > This request from Symantec is to include the following 4 root certificates > and enable the Email trust bit for them. > To be clear: The request is for *only* the email trust bit to be set? I seem to recall we had some discussion a while

Re: Include Symantec-brand Class 1 and Class 2 Root Certs

2016-10-06 Thread Nick Lamb
Thanks Kathleen. I have no substantive objections to this inclusion (with only the Email trust bit to be set) at this time but I do have a minor editorial nitpick which might as well go back to Symantec while we're here. On page 1 of the Introduction of the CP document, a footnote refers to "th

Re: WoSign and StartCom: next steps

2016-10-06 Thread Ryan Sleevi
On Tuesday, October 4, 2016 at 9:25:16 AM UTC-7, Gervase Markham wrote: > On 29/09/16 16:40, Gervase Markham wrote: > > Following the publication of the recent investigative report, > > representatives of Qihoo 360 and StartCom have requested a face-to-face > > meeting with Mozilla. We have accepte

Include Symantec-brand Class 1 and Class 2 Root Certs

2016-10-06 Thread Kathleen Wilson
This request from Symantec is to include the following 4 root certificates and enable the Email trust bit for them. 1) Symantec Class 1 Public Primary Certification Authority - G6 2) Symantec Class 2 Public Primary Certification Authority - G6 3) Symantec Class 1 Public Primary Certification Autho

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-10-06 Thread Man Ho (Certizen)
On 10/6/2016 10:49 AM, Peter Bowen wrote: > I think the community has discussed cross-signing both in this > discussion and in the broader discussion of the trust graph. > > https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:WoSign_Issues#Cross_Signing lists all the > known cross-signs of WoSign. > > https://wiki.mozill

Re: Incident Report - certificate with 'sb' as a SAN:dnsName

2016-10-06 Thread Peter Bowen
On Thu, Oct 6, 2016 at 7:29 AM, Rob Stradling wrote: > On 04/10/16 19:39, Peter Bowen wrote: >> On Tue, Oct 4, 2016 at 6:29 AM, Rob Stradling >> wrote: >>> On 04/10/16 13:18, Nick Lamb wrote: On Tuesday, 4 October 2016 11:14:01 UTC+1, Rob Stradling wrote: > Neither. I'd like to run ca

Re: Incident Report - certificate with 'sb' as a SAN:dnsName

2016-10-06 Thread Rob Stradling
On 04/10/16 19:39, Peter Bowen wrote: > On Tue, Oct 4, 2016 at 6:29 AM, Rob Stradling > wrote: >> On 04/10/16 13:18, Nick Lamb wrote: >>> On Tuesday, 4 October 2016 11:14:01 UTC+1, Rob Stradling wrote: Neither. I'd like to run cablint over all certs pre-issuance, but unfortunately it'

Re: SHA-1 exception First Data

2016-10-06 Thread Jakob Bohm
On 06/10/2016 15:58, Gervase Markham wrote: On 06/10/16 12:38, Jakob Bohm wrote: Which is why I have repeatedly suggested that maybe the rules should be changed to promote/demote some of the historic SHA-1 root certs into "SHA-1 forever" roots that can service older devices and browsers, even fo

Re: SHA-1 exception First Data

2016-10-06 Thread Gervase Markham
On 06/10/16 12:38, Jakob Bohm wrote: > Which is why I have repeatedly suggested that maybe the rules should be > changed to promote/demote some of the historic SHA-1 root certs into > "SHA-1 forever" roots that can service older devices and browsers, even > for regular websites concerned about allo

Re: SHA-1 exception First Data

2016-10-06 Thread Jakob Bohm
On 06/10/2016 07:46, Peter Bowen wrote: On Wed, Oct 5, 2016 at 10:02 PM, Michael Ströder wrote: Dean Coclin wrote: First Data's customers don't use browsers so Firefox can disable SHA-1 tomorrow and not affect them. So why to have your CA certificate trusted in Firefox's cert DB? First Dat