Re: DRAFT January 2018 CA Communication

On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 4:20 PM, Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 1:02 PM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 3:34 PM, Wayne Thayer

Re: DRAFT January 2018 CA Communication

On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 3:34 PM, Wayne Thayer wrote: > On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 11:48 AM, Jonathan Rudenberg < > jonat...@titanous.com> wrote: > >> This is a great improvement. I think we should also ask that any CAs >> using these methods immediate disclose that they are and

Re: DRAFT January 2018 CA Communication

On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 11:48 AM, Jonathan Rudenberg wrote: > This is a great improvement. I think we should also ask that any CAs using > these methods immediate disclose that they are and the procedures they are > using, as well as the date they expect to complete a

Re: DRAFT January 2018 CA Communication

> On Jan 25, 2018, at 13:09, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > Tim - I will add a reference to TLS-SNI-02 as you suggested. I think an > explanation of the new method 12 is too much detail for this message, and > it can be found in the

Re: DRAFT January 2018 CA Communication

Tim - I will add a reference to TLS-SNI-02 as you suggested. I think an explanation of the new method 12 is too much detail for this message, and it can be found in the ballot that I've referenced. In order to move ahead with this communication to CAs while our timeline for the deprecation of BR

Re: GlobalSign certificate with far-future notBefore

On 24/01/18 18:02, Doug Beattie wrote: > Can we consider this case closed with the action that the VWG will > propose a ballot that addresses pre and postdating certificates? Yes. I don't believe anyone has suggested that Globalsign broke a formal rule, either in the BRs or Mozilla's