Re: Logotype extensions

2019-07-12 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
And they will mislead relying parties. Which is why you cannot use *this* particular extension. Sorry, that ship sailed in 2005. A CA that would be remotely be considering exercising this clause would strongly benefit from checking with the Root stores they’re in, no matter the extension

RE: Logotype extensions

2019-07-12 Thread Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
The language of the BRs is pretty permissive. Assuming Mozilla didn't update its policy, then issuance would be permitted if the CA can show that the following was false: b. semantics that, if included, will mislead a Relying Party about the certificate information verified by the CA (such as

Re: Logotype extensions

2019-07-12 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
Alternatively: There is zero reason these should be included in publicly trusted certs used for TLS, and ample harm. It is not necessary nor essential to securing TLS, and that should remain the utmost priority. CAs that wish to issue such certificates can do so from alternate hierarchies. There

RE: Logotype extensions

2019-07-12 Thread Doug Beattie via dev-security-policy
We've beaten the stuffing out of Logotype, imho. - CAs want to add it - Root stores don't - The BRs permit it (probably). - I'll report you to the DoJ, - I'll revoke our Roots, - bla bla bla My personal view is that CAs should be able to include data in extensions as long as they document how