Re: DigiCert OCSP services returns 1 byte

2019-09-11 Thread Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
I think that's perfectly clear but I wanted to double check in case "perfectly clear" was me misreading it. One thing that does come up a lot is whether a CA has to revoke a pre-certificate if the certificate doesn't actually issue. I think this has been adequately answered on the bug lists but

Re: Request to Include 4 Microsoft Root CAs

2019-09-11 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
Having received no further comments, I have recommended approval of this request in bug 1448093. - Wayne On Thu, Sep 5, 2019 at 5:16 PM Wayne Thayer wrote: > Microsoft will use the CAB Forum OID 2.23.140.1.1 for EV. > > Unless a CA has an existing EV policy OID associated with root(s) in our >

Re: DigiCert OCSP services returns 1 byte

2019-09-11 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
Correct. That's what I intended to convey with the last sentence: This means, for example, that the requirements for OCSP for end-entity > certificates apply even when a CA has issued a precertificate without > issuing a corresponding certificate. > Do you have any suggestions for how I can

RE: DigiCert OCSP services returns 1 byte

2019-09-11 Thread Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
Hey Wayne - I take it that this "Mozilla recognizes a precertificate as proof that a corresponding certificate has been issued" means a CA issuing a precert without the final cert must respond "good" unless the pre-cert is revoked? Responding unknown means the CA wouldn't know that they issued

Re: DigiCert OCSP services returns 1 byte

2019-09-11 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
Mozilla has, to-date, not published policies related to Certificate Transparency, but this is a case where a clarification would be helpful. I propose adding the following language to our "Required Practices" wiki page [1]: The current implementation of Certificate Transparency does not provide

Re: EV Jurisdiction of Incorporation

2019-09-11 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
Thanks Jeremy, This is great. I filed https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/188 because this seems like something that can be reused and perhaps even required by policy. On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 5:59 PM Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: >

EV Jurisdiction of Incorporation

2019-09-11 Thread Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
Hi Everyone, One of my goals at DigiCert is provide greater transparency. One of the ideas I’ve kicked around is community-drive EV or EV transparency. To start that off, I thought I’d share the sources we use verification of the jurisdiction of incorporation/registration here. This list is

Re: Trusted Recursive Resolver Policy in India

2019-09-11 Thread rich.salz--- via dev-security-policy
Is this list the right place to discuss the TRR policy? If so, could the wiki page on the policy be updated to point to it? ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Re: SSL.com: OCSP Responder returns incorrect status for certificates failing CT submission

2019-09-11 Thread Chris Kemmerer via dev-security-policy
Copypaste fail, apologies. Correct bug is: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1579509 On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:30:57 AM UTC-5, Christopher Kemmerer wrote: > We have been monitoring the discussions on the m.d.s.p. mailing list > and, after the announcements of

SSL.com: OCSP Responder returns incorrect status for certificates failing CT submission

2019-09-11 Thread Christopher Kemmerer via dev-security-policy
We have been monitoring the discussions on the m.d.s.p. mailing list and, after the announcements of GlobalSign and Let's Encrypt, found that our OCSP responder is affected by the same issue. In particular, whenever a precertificate is generated, but CT submission fails, EJBCA will fail to