On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 07:33:00PM -0700, sandybar497--- via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> Here are the original headers (omitting my email)
>
> ***
>
> MIME-Version: 1.0
> Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 12:07:07 +
> Message-ID:
>
> Subject: Certificate Problem Report - compromised key
> From:
On Wednesday, May 20, 2020 at 3:03:01 AM UTC+10, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 12:38 PM sandybar497--- via
> dev-security-policy wrote:
> > I actually submitted this post 6 days ago and was only just approved
> > today.. is there a lack of resources approving blog posts? just
I inform you that as planned two days ago, Microsec today activated the new CA
software release in the live system.
The CA sofware has been improved to support more automatic checking for the
presence of SN fields for different certificate profiles.
As part of the project, Microsec has
Matthew Hardeman via dev-security-policy
writes:
>The standard use of the most common way of communicating the public key and
>the purported proof-of-possession of the private key to the CA, the CSR, does
>not provide replay protection and yet is frequently NOT treated as a security
>impacting
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