Re: Use of information collected from problem reporting addresses for marketing?

2020-06-02 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Tue, Jun 2, 2020 at 10:25 PM Paul Walsh via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > I dislike being added to lists as much as the next person. There are > numerous reasons for what might have happened. Had you setup an address for > the purpose of contacting them,

Re: Use of information collected from problem reporting addresses for marketing?

2020-06-02 Thread Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
On Tue, Jun 02, 2020 at 06:38:12PM -0700, Benjamin Seidenberg via dev-security-policy wrote: > Today, I received a marketing email from one of the CAs in Mozilla's > program (Sectigo). As far as I know, the only interactions I've ever had > with this CA where they would have gotten my name and

Re: Use of information collected from problem reporting addresses for marketing?

2020-06-02 Thread Paul Walsh via dev-security-policy
I dislike being added to lists as much as the next person. There are numerous reasons for what might have happened. Had you setup an address for the purpose of contacting them, or any other company, you’d know for sure. My personal approach would be to ask them before emailing the list. And

Use of information collected from problem reporting addresses for marketing?

2020-06-02 Thread Benjamin Seidenberg via dev-security-policy
Greetings: Today, I received a marketing email from one of the CAs in Mozilla's program (Sectigo). As far as I know, the only interactions I've ever had with this CA where they would have gotten my name and email address would be from me submitting problem reports to them (for compromised private

Re: Request to Include Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2017 and to EV-enable Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009

2020-06-02 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
I have now reviewed Microsec's updated CPS for OV and DV. I am not going to hold up approval of the inclusion of this root for the following reasons, which I believe are relatively minor, but Microsec should be aware that: - section 3.1.1 of Microsec's "eIDAS conform Certificate for Website

Re: Audit Reminders for Intermediate Certs

2020-06-02 Thread Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
Forwarded Message Subject: Summary of June 2020 Outdated Audit Statements for Intermediate Certs Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 14:00:11 + (GMT) intermediate certs chaining up to root certs in Mozilla's program.> ___