Re: SECURITY RELEVANT FOR CAs: The curious case of the Dangerous Delegated Responder Cert

2020-07-11 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Sat, Jul 11, 2020 at 1:18 PM Oscar Conesa via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > f) For CAs that DO have sole control of the keys: There is no reason to > doubt the CA's ability to continue to maintain the security of these > keys, so the CA could reuse the

Re: SECURITY RELEVANT FOR CAs: The curious case of the Dangerous Delegated Responder Cert

2020-07-11 Thread Filippo Valsorda via dev-security-policy
2020-07-11 13:17 GMT-04:00 Oscar Conesa via dev-security-policy : > f) For CAs that DO have sole control of the keys: There is no reason to > doubt the CA's ability to continue to maintain the security of these > keys, so the CA could reuse the keys by reissuing the certificate with > the same

Re: SECURITY RELEVANT FOR CAs: The curious case of the Dangerous Delegated Responder Cert

2020-07-11 Thread Oscar Conesa via dev-security-policy
As a summary of the situation, we consider that: a) Affected certificates do not comply with the norm (EKU OCSPSigning without OCSP-no-check extension). They are misissued and they must be revoked b) This non-compliance issue has potential security risks in case of key compromise and/or