Thanks to all here for the useful feedback. We've decided not to issue
publicly trusted TLS certificates carrying keys for use in ECIES.
On Thu, Oct 29, 2020 at 11:06 AM Jacob Hoffman-Andrews
wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> ISRG is working with Apple and Google to deploy Prio, a
> "privacy-preserving syste
Hi all,
ISRG is working with Apple and Google to deploy Prio, a "privacy-preserving
system for the collection of aggregate statistics:"
https://crypto.stanford.edu/prio/. Mozilla has previously demonstrated Prio
for use with telemetry data:
https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/10/testing-privacy-preserv
On Sat, Sep 26, 2020 at 9:09 PM Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> Let's Encrypt provides a community mutual assistance site (with
> contributions from staff) on which a large volume of messages are
> posted each day.
>
> https://community.letsencry
Update on this: Thanks to the excellent zmap/zlint tool, we realized we
were missing the digitalSignature keyUsage on our planned new
intermediates. We've updated the demo repo and our forum post (
https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/detailed-2020-hierarchy/131019) to
indicate that we plan to inclu
Let’s Encrypt is planning to issue a new root and new intermediates soon.
The new root will be an ECDSA one, to augment our existing RSA root. The
new intermediates will be part of our regular replacement of intermediates.
Our RSA root will cross-sign the ECDSA root.
We’re sharing our detailed iss
We've posted our Incident Report at
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1619047#c1.
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On Saturday, February 29, 2020 at 4:10:40 AM UTC-8, Nick Lamb wrote:
> Hi Jacob, was there a reason not to use the ordinary incident reporting
> format ? This is pretty good for ensuring you cover all the questions
> we're otherwise likely to ask anyway.
Thanks for the reminder. My goal here was t
Also posted to https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1619047
On 2020-02-29 UTC, Let’s Encrypt found a bug in our CAA code. Our CA software,
Boulder, checks for CAA records at the same time it validates a subscriber’s
control of a domain name. Most subscribers issue a certificate immediat
Also filed at https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1577652
On 2019.08.28 we read Apple’s bug report at
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1577014 about DigiCert’s OCSP
responder returning incorrect results for a precertificate. This prompted us to
run our own investigation. We
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