Re: Revocation Policy

2014-04-21 Thread Peter Eckersley
Removing Startcom from the trust root would be a catastrophe for the security of Mozilla's users, since it would move the Web from one free CA to zero free CAs, thereby forcing over a hundred thousand websites from HTTPS (which is actually still not terrible, even if you had a window of Heartbleed

Re: Turn on hardfail?

2014-04-21 Thread Peter Eckersley
That would have the {justifiable,entertaining,controversial} result of causing any captive portal that uses HTTPS in captivity to fail. Sounds like an interesting proposal if you can persuade all the browsers to do it simultaneously, but if Mozilla does it in isolation, it would unfortunately just

Re: Cloudflare heartbleed challenge, Re: Revocation Policy

2014-04-14 Thread Peter Eckersley
On 13 April 2014 13:36, Florian Weimer wrote: > > The second reason is the following: What you are proposing is a value > judgement. But these have no place in the browser PKI. For example, > a properly contained sub-CA which issues interception certificates for > internal company use arguably

Re: Cloudflare heartbleed challenge, Re: Revocation Policy

2014-04-12 Thread Peter Eckersley
Florian, there's something that about legal rules that is often quite unintuitive to those of us with technical backgrounds: lawyers don't necessarily expect them to be followed exhaustively all of the time. At least in common law countries (.us, .uk, .ca, .au, .il, and many more), legal rules exi

Re: Revocation Policy

2014-04-11 Thread Peter Eckersley
On 11 April 2014 04:06, Matthias Hunstock wrote: > > Implementing a new tool that lets that happen > > automatically, using a signature from the previous key, might be the > right > > way to make that scale. > > you are supposing to trust a signature created by a possibly compromised > key ? >

Re: Revocation Policy

2014-04-10 Thread Peter Eckersley
s >> anti-security and we need to "strongly encourage" they be discontinued in >> short order. If a CA wishes to continue such policies I would question >> their trustworthiness. >> >> Further I think we are reaching the point where browsers have to refuse >> SSL

Re: Revocation Policy

2014-04-10 Thread Peter Eckersley
Kaspar, suppose that Mozilla followed your suggestion and removed StartCom's root certificates from its trust store (or revoked them!). What would the consequences of that decision be, for the large number of domains that rely on StartCom certs? On 10 April 2014 00:46, Kaspar Janßen wrote: > Hi