Re: Leaking private keys through web servers

On 14/07/2017 21:04, Ryan Sleevi wrote: On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 2:07 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: That's my point. The current situation is distinct from weak keys, and we shouldn't sacrifice the weak keys BR to make room for a

Re: Leaking private keys through web servers

On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 2:07 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > That's my point. The current situation is distinct from weak keys, and > we shouldn't sacrifice the weak keys BR to make room for a compromised > keys BR. But a weak key is

Re: Leaking private keys through web servers

On 14/07/2017 18:19, Ryan Sleevi wrote: On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 11:11 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: On 14/07/2017 15:53, Ryan Sleevi wrote: On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 1:29 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <

Re: Leaking private keys through web servers

On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 11:11 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On 14/07/2017 15:53, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > >> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 1:29 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < >> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: >> >>> >>> But

Re: Leaking private keys through web servers

On 14/07/2017 16:07, Alex Gaynor wrote: On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:03 AM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 9:44 AM, Hanno Böck via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: ... >> ...

Re: Leaking private keys through web servers

On 14/07/2017 15:53, Ryan Sleevi wrote: On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 1:29 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: But that doesn't clearly include keys that are weak for other reasons, such as a 512 bit RSA key with an exponent of 4 (as an extreme

Re: Leaking private keys through web servers

On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 10:03 AM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 9:44 AM, Hanno Böck via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > > > So there are several questions and possible

Re: Leaking private keys through web servers

On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 9:44 AM, Hanno Böck via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > So there are several questions and possible situations here. > > I think it's relatively clear that a CA could prevent reissuance of > certs if they know about a key compromise.

Re: Leaking private keys through web servers

On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 1:29 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > But that doesn't clearly include keys that are weak for other reasons, > such as a 512 bit RSA key with an exponent of 4 (as an extreme example). > Yes. Because that's clearly

Re: Leaking private keys through web servers

On Wed, 12 Jul 2017 10:47:51 -0400 Ryan Sleevi wrote: > One challenge to consider is how this is quantified. Obviously, if you > reported to Comodo the issue with the key, and then they issued > another certificate with that key, arguably that's something Comodo > should have

Re: Leaking private keys through web servers

On 12/07/2017 16:47, Ryan Sleevi wrote: On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 10:19 AM, Hanno Böck via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: * Comodo re-issued certs with the same key. I wonder if there should be a rule that once a key compromise event is known to the CA it

Re: Leaking private keys through web servers

On Thu, Jul 13, 2017 at 7:07 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On 12/07/17 15:47, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > One challenge to consider is how this is quantified. Obviously, if you > > reported to Comodo the issue with the key, and then they

Re: Leaking private keys through web servers

On 12/07/17 15:47, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > One challenge to consider is how this is quantified. Obviously, if you > reported to Comodo the issue with the key, and then they issued another > certificate with that key, arguably that's something Comodo should have > caught. I'd say so. > However, if

Leaking private keys through web servers

Hello, I recently did an investigation where I tried to simply download private keys from web servers with common filenames. I collected these filenames simply from common tutorials on the web (server.key, privatekey.key, myserver.key, key.pem and [hostname].key with and without www). In several