Erwann Abalea wrote:
> In the list, some root certificates belong to active certificate issuers
> (but with different roots), so there's little security risks (I believe an
> active issuer protects all its keys the same way).
Erwann, I think the opposite is true:
Given the fact that there were a b
On 25/03/14 12:20, Rob Stradling wrote:
On 24/03/14 18:57, Erwann Abalea wrote:
The list contains root CAs that are only used for email, some that
deliver Qualified Certificates, others that haven't been used yet
(such as some ECC ones)
I bet their scanner didn't offer any ECDH(E) ciphers.
On 24/03/14 18:57, Erwann Abalea wrote:
The list contains root CAs that are only used for email, some that deliver
Qualified Certificates, others that haven't been used yet (such as some ECC
ones)
I bet their scanner didn't offer any ECDH(E) ciphers.
There aren't many ECC certs out there ye
Bonjour,
The list can be found at
http://www.heise.de/downloads/18/1/1/8/8/4/3/5/bogo-ca.csv
Le lundi 24 mars 2014 16:03:26 UTC+1, Gervase Markham a écrit :
> "You Won't Be Needing These Any More: On Removing Unused Certificates
> From Trust Stores"
>
> http://fc14.ifca.ai/papers/fc14_submiss
"You Won’t Be Needing These Any More: On Removing Unused Certificates
From Trust Stores"
http://fc14.ifca.ai/papers/fc14_submission_100.pdf
I believe there are some errors in it, like the "1500 CAs and 650
organizations" one. The biggest error is probably the suggestion that
the Mozilla trust
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