Re: TSYS Application for SHA-1 Issuance - Counter-cryptanalysis

2016-08-01 Thread Marc Stevens
Dear all, It has been pointed out to me that the second set I checked are actually old certificates instead of the TBSparts. As I mention below, the counter-cryptanalysis is only valid for the exact TBS part that has those hashes. Therefore, I have redone my analysis on the TBS parts of the

Re: TSYS Application for SHA-1 Issuance - Counter-cryptanalysis

2016-07-28 Thread Rick Andrews
On Tuesday, July 19, 2016 at 1:05:13 PM UTC-7, Andrew Whalley wrote: > Greetings, > > I have run the tool provided by dr.ir. Marc Stevens [1] on the > tbsCertificates provided by Symantec [2] > > And see no evidence of collisions: > > $ ./sha1dcsum_partialcoll *.tbs >

Re: TSYS Application for SHA-1 Issuance - Counter-cryptanalysis

2016-07-25 Thread Marc Stevens
Dear Andrew, I have created an extended version of my collision detection library [1] that, instead of a small selection of best disturbance vectors for SHA-1 collision attacks, simply tests all disturbance vectors within the two classes (see p125 of [2]). This should rule out *all*

Re: TSYS Application for SHA-1 Issuance - Counter-cryptanalysis

2016-07-21 Thread Erwann Abalea
Le mardi 19 juillet 2016 22:05:13 UTC+2, Andrew Whalley a écrit : > Greetings, > > I have run the tool provided by dr.ir. Marc Stevens [1] on the > tbsCertificates provided by Symantec [2] > > And see no evidence of collisions: > > $ ./sha1dcsum_partialcoll *.tbs >