On 22/01/2018 10:47, Gervase Markham wrote:
On 19/01/18 13:20, Jakob Bohm wrote:
My suggestions are only meant to inspire formal rules written / chosen
by module leaders such as you.
But the entire point of this discussion is that we are pointing out it's
hard to make such rules in the way
On 19/01/18 13:20, Jakob Bohm wrote:
> My suggestions are only meant to inspire formal rules written / chosen
> by module leaders such as you.
But the entire point of this discussion is that we are pointing out it's
hard to make such rules in the way you have just made them without being
On 19/01/2018 11:09, Gervase Markham wrote:
On 19/01/18 01:05, Jakob Bohm wrote:
On 18/01/2018 11:01, Gervase Markham wrote:
On 17/01/18 19:49, Jakob Bohm wrote:
3. Major vertical CAs for high value business categories that issue
publicly trusted certificates at better than EV level
On 19/01/18 01:05, Jakob Bohm wrote:
> On 18/01/2018 11:01, Gervase Markham wrote:
>> On 17/01/18 19:49, Jakob Bohm wrote:
>>> 3. Major vertical CAs for high value business categories that issue
>>> publicly trusted certificates at better than EV level integrity. For
>>
>> How do you define
On 18/01/2018 11:01, Gervase Markham wrote:
On 17/01/18 19:49, Jakob Bohm wrote:
3. Major vertical CAs for high value business categories that issue
publicly trusted certificates at better than EV level integrity. For
How do you define "major"? And "high value business category"?
Major
On 17/01/18 19:49, Jakob Bohm wrote:
> 3. Major vertical CAs for high value business categories that issue
> publicly trusted certificates at better than EV level integrity. For
How do you define "major"? And "high value business category"?
> 4. Selected company CAs for a handful of
On 17/01/2018 22:51, Peter Bowen wrote:
On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 11:49 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
wrote:
4. Selected company CAs for a handful of too-bit-to-ignore companies
that refuse to use a true public CA. This would currently probably
On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 11:49 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> 4. Selected company CAs for a handful of too-bit-to-ignore companies
> that refuse to use a true public CA. This would currently probably
> be Microsoft, Amazon and Google.
As for what CA organizations to include in a future iteration of the
Mozilla root store, I would say that there are 4 groups that I (as a
browser user) would like to get included and 2 which I would not:
1. Global public CAs that provide certificates to subscribers from all
over the world
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