Hello all,
My colleague Andre and I recently became aware of this problem and we explored
a new solution to it.
Please find our analysis below.
For a formatted version of this message with images inline, please find it
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On Sun, Nov 15, 2020 at 04:52:38AM +, Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> This makes clear that the CA must have at least one of these "clearly
> specified" accepted methods which ought to actually help Matt get some
> traction.
I doubt it. So far, every CA that's decided to come up
On Mon, 16 Nov 2020 10:13:16 +1100
Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> I doubt it. So far, every CA that's decided to come up with their own
> method of proving key compromise has produced something entirely
> proprietary to themselves.
At least two CAs (and from what I can tell likely
On 2020-11-15 1:04 π.μ., Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy wrote:
On Sat, Nov 14, 2020 at 2:05 PM Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
wrote:
So, perhaps now that we've had this conversation, and you've learned about
potentially illegitimate revocations are a thing, but that they were not
On 2020-11-14 5:01 π.μ., Ryan Sleevi wrote:
I believe it's possible to do, with the original language, but this
requires the CA to proactively take steps to address that in their
CP/CPS. That is, I think it'd be reasonable for an auditor to conclude
that, if a CA stated "We do X, Y, Z" in
On Sun, Nov 15, 2020 at 6:02 AM Dimitris Zacharopoulos
wrote:
>
>
> On 2020-11-15 1:04 π.μ., Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy wrote:
> > On Sat, Nov 14, 2020 at 2:05 PM Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
> > wrote:
> >> So, perhaps now that we've had this conversation, and you've learned
>
On Sat, Nov 14, 2020 at 11:52 PM Nick Lamb wrote:
> On Sat, 14 Nov 2020 17:05:26 -0500
> Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>
> > I don't entirely appreciate being told that I don't know what I'm
> > talking about, which is how this reply comes across, but as I've
> > stated several times, the _original_
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