Re: HARICA Root Renewal Request

2016-02-23 Thread Dimitris Zacharopoulos
On 22/2/2016 6:52 μμ, Peter Kurrasch wrote: Hi Dimitris, ‎You certainly echo the sentiment of others in this forum by directing me to the CABF but my concerns are particular to HARICA at this point. Simply put, the CABF BR has security gaps in section 3.2.2.4 which can result in certificate

Re: Proposed limited exception to SHA-1 issuance

2016-02-23 Thread Richard Barnes
On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 6:26 PM, Eric Mill wrote: > On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 1:57 PM, Gervase Markham wrote: > >> >> Our proposal, which we have sent to Symantec, Worldpay and the other >> browsers, is as follows: >> > > Thank you for bringing this to the

Re: Proposed limited exception to SHA-1 issuance

2016-02-23 Thread Eric Mill
On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 9:38 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote: > Gervase Markham writes: > > >Mozilla is very keen to see SHA-1 eliminated, but understands that for > >historical reasons poor decisions were made in private PKIs about which > roots > >to

RE: Proposed limited exception to SHA-1 issuance

2016-02-23 Thread Peter Gutmann
Gervase Markham writes: >Mozilla is very keen to see SHA-1 eliminated, but understands that for >historical reasons poor decisions were made in private PKIs about which roots >to trust, and such decisions are not easily remedied. I'm curious about what's going on here, as you

Re: Proposed limited exception to SHA-1 issuance

2016-02-23 Thread Eric Mill
On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 1:57 PM, Gervase Markham wrote: > > Our proposal, which we have sent to Symantec, Worldpay and the other > browsers, is as follows: > Thank you for bringing this to the list for public input, even with a tight timeline and under immense pressure. It

Re: Proposed limited exception to SHA-1 issuance

2016-02-23 Thread Steve
Large quantities of SHA-1 certificates were issued in the weeks prior to the deadline as operators of systems not intended for primarily browser based consumption maximized their remaining compliant lifespan, Embedded physical deployment of devices that are not updated at browser speed runs the

Re: Proposed limited exception to SHA-1 issuance

2016-02-23 Thread tech29063
On Tuesday, February 23, 2016 at 10:58:19 AM UTC-8, Gervase Markham wrote: > Mozilla and other browsers have been approached by Worldpay, a large > payment processor, via Symantec, their CA. They have been transitioning > to SHA-2 but due to an oversight have failed to do so in time for a >

Re: Proposed limited exception to SHA-1 issuance

2016-02-23 Thread Richard Barnes
On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 12:05 PM, Andrew Ayer wrote: > On Tue, 23 Feb 2016 18:57:41 + > Gervase Markham wrote: > > > Please comment on whether this proposal seems reasonable, being aware > > of the short timelines involved. > > I am opposed. There is

Re: Proposed limited exception to SHA-1 issuance

2016-02-23 Thread Richard Barnes
On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 1:47 PM, Andrew Ayer wrote: > On Tue, 23 Feb 2016 13:12:27 -0800 > Yuhong Bao wrote: > > > If OneCRL always used the same hash algorithm as the certificate, > > then any colliding certificate would also be treated as

Re: Proposed limited exception to SHA-1 issuance

2016-02-23 Thread Richard Barnes
On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 1:44 PM, Charles Reiss wrote: > On 02/23/16 18:57, Gervase Markham wrote: > [snip] > > Symantec may issue certificates to Worldpay if the following things are > > true: > > Based on what's happened with MD5 certificates, it seems the main risk > of

Re: Proposed limited exception to SHA-1 issuance

2016-02-23 Thread tech29063
On Tuesday, February 23, 2016 at 10:58:19 AM UTC-8, Gervase Markham wrote: > Mozilla and other browsers have been approached by Worldpay, a large > payment processor, via Symantec, their CA. They have been transitioning > to SHA-2 but due to an oversight have failed to do so in time for a >

Re: Proposed limited exception to SHA-1 issuance

2016-02-23 Thread Charles Reiss
On 02/23/16 18:57, Gervase Markham wrote: [snip] > Symantec may issue certificates to Worldpay if the following things are > true: Based on what's happened with MD5 certificates, it seems the main risk of harm comes from something like a chosen-prefix collision attack using a specially

Re: Proposed limited exception to SHA-1 issuance

2016-02-23 Thread Andrew Ayer
On Tue, 23 Feb 2016 18:57:41 + Gervase Markham wrote: > Please comment on whether this proposal seems reasonable, being aware > of the short timelines involved. I am opposed. There is no telling how many other organizations are in a similar situation due to poor planning