Re: 46 certificates issued with BR violations

2018-10-08 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
> > On Mon, Oct 8, 2018 at 4:06 PM Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > >> On Mon, 8 Oct 2018 03:43:53 -0700 (PDT) >> "piotr.grabowski--- via dev-security-policy" >> wrote: >> >> > We have by the way question about error: ERROR: The 'Organization

Re: 46 Certificates issued with BR violations (KIR)

2018-10-08 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Mon, Oct 8, 2018 at 11:25 AM piotr.grabowski--- via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Here's the incident report: > > 1.How your CA first became aware of the problem (e.g. via a problem > report submitted to your Problem Reporting Mechanism, via a > >

Re: 46 certificates issued with BR violations

2018-10-08 Thread Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
On Mon, 8 Oct 2018 03:43:53 -0700 (PDT) "piotr.grabowski--- via dev-security-policy" wrote: > We have by the way question about error: ERROR: The 'Organization > Name' field of the subject MUST be less than 64 characters. According > to https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt and the note from this

Re: 46 Certificates issued with BR violations (KIR)

2018-10-08 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
Thank you for the incident report. I have posted it to the bug: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1495497 On Mon, Oct 8, 2018 at 8:25 AM piotr.grabowski--- via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Here's the incident report: > > 1.How your CA first

46 Certificates issued with BR violations (KIR)

2018-10-08 Thread piotr.grabowski--- via dev-security-policy
Here's the incident report: 1.How your CA first became aware of the problem (e.g. via a problem report submitted to your Problem Reporting Mechanism, via a discussion in mozilla.dev.security.policy, or via a Bugzilla bug), and the date. Email from Wayne Thayer Oct 1, 2018 2.

46 certificates issued with BR violations

2018-10-08 Thread piotr.grabowski--- via dev-security-policy
Here's the incident report: 1.How your CA first became aware of the problem (e.g. via a problem report submitted to your Problem Reporting Mechanism, via a discussion in mozilla.dev.security.policy, or via a Bugzilla bug), and the date. Email from Wayne Thayer Oct 1, 2018 2.A

February 13, 2019: EOL for All Let's Encrypt TLS-SNI-01 Validation Support

2018-10-08 Thread josh--- via dev-security-policy
Let’s Encrypt allows subscribers to validate domain control using any one of a few different validation methods. For much of the time Let’s Encrypt has been operating, the options were “DNS-01”, “HTTP-01”, and “TLS-SNI-01”. We recently introduced the “TLS-ALPN-01” method. Today we are