Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours

2020-03-30 Thread Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
On Tue, Mar 31, 2020 at 01:34:27PM +1100, Matt Palmer wrote: > If someone would like to make the argument that it's a gray area because I > submitted the revocation requests via ACME, rather than the CPS-provided > e-mail address, well, I can switch to sending e-mails, but having a human > process

Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours

2020-03-30 Thread Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
On Mon, Mar 30, 2020 at 06:01:58PM -0400, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > On Mon, Mar 30, 2020 at 5:43 PM Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > > > On Mon, Mar 30, 2020 at 01:48:28PM -0700, Josh Aas via dev-security-policy > > wrote: > > > Matt - It would be helpful if you could report issues

Re: Proposal for New CA Certificate Policy Module Owner

2020-03-30 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
This change has been made and Kathleen Wilson is now the CA Certificate Policy Module Owner. On Fri, Mar 20, 2020 at 1:34 PM Wayne Thayer wrote: > I posted the following message in the mozilla.governance forum. > > If you would like, please feel free to comment here in m.d.s.p. > > - Wayne > >

Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours

2020-03-30 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Mon, Mar 30, 2020 at 5:43 PM Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy wrote: > > On Mon, Mar 30, 2020 at 01:48:28PM -0700, Josh Aas via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > Matt - It would be helpful if you could report issues like this to the CA > > in question, not just to mdsp. > > Helpful to

Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours

2020-03-30 Thread Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
On Mon, Mar 30, 2020 at 01:48:28PM -0700, Josh Aas via dev-security-policy wrote: > Matt - It would be helpful if you could report issues like this to the CA > in question, not just to mdsp. Helpful to *whom*, exactly? I don't write up these reports to be helpful to the CA in question; I write

Re: Proposal: prohibit issuance of new certificates with known-compromised keys, and for related purposes

2020-03-30 Thread Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
On Mon, Mar 30, 2020 at 10:59:02AM -0400, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > On Mon, Mar 30, 2020 at 6:28 AM Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy > wrote: > It's useful to focus on the goal, rather than the precise language, or > where you see folks getting confused or misunderstanding things. That > is,

Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours

2020-03-30 Thread Josh Aas via dev-security-policy
On Monday, March 30, 2020 at 4:48:38 PM UTC-4, Josh Aas wrote: > On Thursday, March 26, 2020 at 6:27:10 PM UTC-4, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > Apologies for the delay here. I filed > > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1625322 for this. > > We are looking into this. > > Matt - It would be

Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours

2020-03-30 Thread Josh Aas via dev-security-policy
On Thursday, March 26, 2020 at 6:27:10 PM UTC-4, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > Apologies for the delay here. I filed > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1625322 for this. We are looking into this. Matt - It would be helpful if you could report issues like this to the CA in question, not just

Re: Request to Include Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2017 and to EV-enable Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009

2020-03-30 Thread Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
Dear All, Microsec Ltd. is dedicated to comply with the standards and industry best practices at all times, including the applicable IETF RFCs, ETSI standards and technical specifications, CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements, Extended Validation Guidelines and Network Security Controls, as

Re: Proposal: prohibit issuance of new certificates with known-compromised keys, and for related purposes

2020-03-30 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
Thanks for starting this! On Mon, Mar 30, 2020 at 6:28 AM Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy wrote: > If such a modification were deemed appropriate for the BRs, I would suggest > that the following changes would fit the bill. All sections, etc taken from > version 1.6.7 of the BRs.

Re: Musings on mass key-compromise revocations

2020-03-30 Thread Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
On Sat, Mar 28, 2020 at 07:11:43PM +1100, Matt Palmer wrote: > In concert with my (human-mediated) revocation notifications, I have been > sending semi-automated revocation requests to Let's Encrypt, using the ACME > protocol. This has been extremely smooth and straightforward, and my life > --

Proposal: prohibit issuance of new certificates with known-compromised keys, and for related purposes

2020-03-30 Thread Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
In my recent forays into mass-revocation for key compromise, one aspect that was particularly frustrating and unnecessary was having to send revocation requests for new certificates, issued by a CA using a private key which I had previously reported as compromised to that same CA. Once a key is