Re: Synopsis of Proposed Changes to MRSP v. 2.7.1

2021-03-10 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
Thanks, Ryan
I'll work on incorporating your suggestions into the draft we're working on.
Ben

On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 9:10 AM Ryan Sleevi  wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, Mar 8, 2021 at 7:08 PM Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
>> #139 resolved - Audits are required even if no longer issuing, until CA
>> certificate is revoked, expired, or removed.
>>
>> See
>>
>> https://github.com/BenWilson-Mozilla/pkipolicy/commit/888dc139d196b02707d228583ac20564ddb27b35
>>
>
> I'm assuming you're OK with this, but just wanting to make sure it's
> explicit:
>
> In the scenario where the CA destroys the private key, they may still have
> outstanding certificates that work in Mozilla products. If Mozilla is
> relying on infrastructure provided by that CA (e.g. OCSP, CRL), the CA no
> longer has an obligation to audit that infrastructure.
>
> I suspect that the idea is that if/when a CA destroys the private key,
> that the expectation is Mozilla will promptly remove/revoke the root, but
> just wanted to call out that there is a gap between the operational life
> cycle of a CA (e.g. providing revocation services) and the private key
> lifecycle.
>
> If this isn't intended, then removing the "or until all copies" should
> resolve this, but of course, open up new discussion.
>
>
>> #221 resolved - Wrong hyperlink for “material change” in MRSP section 8
>>
>> Replace hyperlink with “there is a change in the CA's operations that
>> could
>> significantly affect a CA's ability to comply with the requirements of
>> this
>> Policy.”
>>
>>
>> https://github.com/BenWilson-Mozilla/pkipolicy/commit/fbe04aa64f931940af967ed90ab98aa95789f057
>
>
> Since "significantly" is highly subjective, and can lead the CA to not
> disclosing, what would be the impact of just dropping the word? That is,
> "that could affect a CA's ability to comply". There's still an element of
> subjectivity here, for sure, but it encourages CAs to over-disclose, rather
> than under-disclose, as the current language does.
>
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Re: Synopsis of Proposed Changes to MRSP v. 2.7.1

2021-03-10 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Mon, Mar 8, 2021 at 7:08 PM Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

> #139 resolved - Audits are required even if no longer issuing, until CA
> certificate is revoked, expired, or removed.
>
> See
>
> https://github.com/BenWilson-Mozilla/pkipolicy/commit/888dc139d196b02707d228583ac20564ddb27b35
>

I'm assuming you're OK with this, but just wanting to make sure it's
explicit:

In the scenario where the CA destroys the private key, they may still have
outstanding certificates that work in Mozilla products. If Mozilla is
relying on infrastructure provided by that CA (e.g. OCSP, CRL), the CA no
longer has an obligation to audit that infrastructure.

I suspect that the idea is that if/when a CA destroys the private key, that
the expectation is Mozilla will promptly remove/revoke the root, but just
wanted to call out that there is a gap between the operational life cycle
of a CA (e.g. providing revocation services) and the private key lifecycle.

If this isn't intended, then removing the "or until all copies" should
resolve this, but of course, open up new discussion.


> #221 resolved - Wrong hyperlink for “material change” in MRSP section 8
>
> Replace hyperlink with “there is a change in the CA's operations that could
> significantly affect a CA's ability to comply with the requirements of this
> Policy.”
>
>
> https://github.com/BenWilson-Mozilla/pkipolicy/commit/fbe04aa64f931940af967ed90ab98aa95789f057


Since "significantly" is highly subjective, and can lead the CA to not
disclosing, what would be the impact of just dropping the word? That is,
"that could affect a CA's ability to comply". There's still an element of
subjectivity here, for sure, but it encourages CAs to over-disclose, rather
than under-disclose, as the current language does.
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