Re: What we want [was: Audit requirements for government CAs]

2008-03-30 Thread Frank Hecker
Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: > But our Mozilla policy hasn't kept pace with the developments of the CA > industry and that of its browser, except the addition of the EV > criteria. Effectively the Mozilla CA policy remained static since its > introduction, which is perhaps desirable (that a

Re: Comodo request for EV-enabling 3 existing roots

2008-03-30 Thread Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)
As I promised to come back to you, here what I gathered so far. Both certificates from the links below are issued by GoDaddy. Both GoDaddy and Comodo CPS have similar requirements in the subscriber obligation and/or reasons for revocations: Starfield (GoDaddy) 2.2.1.4 (iv) the Subscriber f

Re: KISA root CA certificate inclusion request

2008-03-30 Thread Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)
Frank Hecker: > Nelson B Bolyard wrote: > >> But I believe we have already decided, in principle, to approve certs for >> CAs that are subordinate to some root that is not approved, when the >> subordinate CA meets the criteria, but the root does not. >> > > Yes, I recall this discussion. H

Re: KISA root CA certificate inclusion request

2008-03-30 Thread Frank Hecker
Nelson B Bolyard wrote: > But I believe we have already decided, in principle, to approve certs for > CAs that are subordinate to some root that is not approved, when the > subordinate CA meets the criteria, but the root does not. Yes, I recall this discussion. However in the KISA case my opinion

Re: Audit requirements for government CAs

2008-03-30 Thread Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)
Frank Hecker: > Microsoft has taken an interesting approach to this problem, one that I > think is worth discussing: > > "[F]or government CAs who issue certificates to secure government to > government or citizen to government transactions, Microsoft will accept > a statement from a government

Re: What we want [was: Audit requirements for government CAs]

2008-03-30 Thread Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)
Kyle Hamilton: > I want a user interface which allows me -- at a minimum -- to see what > CA signed a given certificate, how that CA is in my store (whether it > was provided by Mozilla or the administrator or through my own > action), the subject of the certificate, and the validity period of > th

Re: KISA root CA certificate inclusion request

2008-03-30 Thread Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)
Frank, in order to continue the discussion below I really want to understand first 1.) If our stated goal is simply to facilitate the inclusion of as many CAs as possible 2.) If the principals guiding us are limited to the Mozilla CA policy only 3.) And if is, what we want, simply to provide jus

Re: KISA root CA certificate inclusion request

2008-03-30 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
Frank Hecker wrote, On 2008-03-30 04:29: > Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: >> OK, so in that case KISA itself is becoming an auditor. Would KISA then >> issue audit reports about the various CAs in question? What would be the >> pros and cons of having each licensed CA approved instead of KISA a

importUserCertificates () and CMMF

2008-03-30 Thread Anders Rundgren
Hi, I managed to get generateCRMFrequest () to work with ease. However, the next step seems a bit harder since http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/importUserCertificates talks about an CMMF object that doesn't seem to be commonly known. I believe that Robert Relyea has answered this in some forum

Re: KISA root CA certificate inclusion request

2008-03-30 Thread Frank Hecker
Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: > I agree with everything you said below for regular, standard CAs. This > is what the policy knew when it was written. There is a CA, they have a > root and some intermediate CA certificates (according to the > recommendations after all), they are one entity tak

Re: KISA root CA certificate inclusion request

2008-03-30 Thread David E. Ross
On 3/30/2008 4:57 AM, Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: > Hi Frank, > > I agree with everything you said below for regular, standard CAs. This > is what the policy knew when it was written. There is a CA, they have a > root and some intermediate CA certificates (according to the > recommendation

Re: What we want [was: Audit requirements for government CAs]

2008-03-30 Thread Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)
And in continuation to the other posts I made: - Do we require an audit in the Mozilla CA policy because we want to have a third party confirmation about the CAs infrastructure and full implementation of its policies or do we require an audit just for its sake? - Do we require minimal validati

Re: KISA root CA certificate inclusion request

2008-03-30 Thread Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)
Hi Frank, I agree with everything you said below for regular, standard CAs. This is what the policy knew when it was written. There is a CA, they have a root and some intermediate CA certificates (according to the recommendations after all), they are one entity taking responsibility for their

Re: KISA root CA certificate inclusion request

2008-03-30 Thread Frank Hecker
Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: > OK, so in that case KISA itself is becoming an auditor. Would KISA then > issue audit reports about the various CAs in question? What would be the > pros and cons of having each licensed CA approved instead of KISA as a > "wild card" CA for a whole country? On