> As reported inhttps://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=408949#c27
> this CA uses partitioned CRLs with CRL IDP extensions marked critical.
> NSS does not handle partitioned CRLs at this time, and any CRLs with
> critical CRL IDP extensions are rejected due to the presence of
> unknown critica
This isn't a problem with our IT folks, they solve their part in record
time, typically. Google groups has been having troubles lately picking
up both this and another group that was recently created. We've
contacted them about it, but we don't really want a bunch of people
posting threads in
Can we please have someone at Mozilla light a fire under the sysadmin
staff to get this working?
-Kyle H
On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 8:20 PM, Gervase Markham wrote:
> Paul Hoffman wrote:
>> Having a separate policy list would help the technology folks focus
>> on what they do best. It would also hel
On 02/10/2009 03:23 AM, Nelson B Bolyard:
While I do not wish in any way to question or reduce the value of
Kathleen's evaluation, I wonder if it is right for us to allow CA
applications to be approved in the absence of any real public discussion.
In the complete absence of any discussion, posit
Thank you for bringing this up, Nelson. I would hope that your
observation (as a much larger figure in the Mozilla organization than
I or Eddy or much of anyone else) and worry will carry more weight
than the people outside the inner circle.
-Kyle H
On Mon, Feb 9, 2009 at 5:23 PM, Nelson B Bolya
Hey, I just ran into the first application of client certificate
authentication requirement on a public US government website that I've
seen.
[link] https://sportal.uspto.gov/secure/portal/efs-unregistered
[/link] has information on the "unregistered submission" process, but
it also strongly encou
On 02/10/2009 03:14 AM, Nelson B Bolyard:
Eddy Nigg wrote, On 2009-02-09 11:54:
On 02/09/2009 09:35 PM, kathleen95...@yahoo.com:
Of course. I will await your next post to this discussion.
Just browsing through the various documents and I noticed the following
so far.
It seems to me that the
Nelson,
Nelson B Bolyard wrote:
This is probably a policy question, but: are we willing to accept CAs
that use CRLs that we cannot parse?
It seems to me that the answer should be the same as for all other
subordinate CAs that exist today, over which the Mozilla foundation has
no control, and
Our esteemed kathleen95...@yahoo.com wrote on 2009-02-09 10:44 PST:
> As per the CA Schedule at https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Schedule
> Hongkong Post is the next request in the queue for public discussion.
>
> Hongkong Post (a national government CA under the law of Hong Kong
> Special Administrati
I'd post this in the policy working group, if that was operational ... :(
In
our esteemed Kathleen Wilson wrote:
> According to https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:How_to_apply
> “If there are no open issues or action items after the first
> discussion period, and there is general agreement that you co
Eddy Nigg wrote, On 2009-02-09 11:54:
> On 02/09/2009 09:35 PM, kathleen95...@yahoo.com:
>> Of course. I will await your next post to this discussion.
>>
>
> Just browsing through the various documents and I noticed the following
> so far.
>
> It seems to me that the code signing bit *should not
On 02/09/2009 09:35 PM, kathleen95...@yahoo.com:
Of course. I will await your next post to this discussion.
Just browsing through the various documents and I noticed the following
so far.
It seems to me that the code signing bit *should not* be activated, it
should be reflected in the "Pen
Of course. I will await your next post to this discussion.
--
dev-tech-crypto mailing list
dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
On 9/2/09 20:15, Ben Bucksch wrote:
On 09.02.2009 17:45, Ian G wrote:
I've posted something ... hopefully non-contraversial ...: a
suggestion on the list charter.
That was a good one.
It didn't last more than 30 seconds :-) Oh well, I suppose the list
will be active some time.
iang
--
d
On 09.02.2009 17:45, Ian G wrote:
I've posted something ... hopefully non-contraversial ...: a
suggestion on the list charter.
That was a good one.
--
dev-tech-crypto mailing list
dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
On 02/09/2009 08:38 PM, kathleen95...@yahoo.com:
Certigna’s root inclusion request has been in public discussion for a
week now. No issues or concerns about this request have been raised.
According to https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:How_to_apply
“If there are no open issues or action items after the
As per the CA Schedule at https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Schedule
Hongkong Post is the next request in the queue for public discussion.
Hongkong Post (a national government CA under the law of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of China) has applied to add one new
root CA certificate to the Mozi
Certigna’s root inclusion request has been in public discussion for a
week now. No issues or concerns about this request have been raised.
According to https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:How_to_apply
“If there are no open issues or action items after the first
discussion period, and there is general agre
On 5/2/09 18:34, Frank Hecker wrote:
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
so perhaps it's working as well. (I don't read these forums via email,
perhaps you or someone else can try subscribing.)
Yes, email is working fine. Dunno about the rest.
Given the problems we've ha
On Wed, Feb 4, 2009 at 8:04 PM, Robert Relyea wrote:
> Ahnjoan Amous wrote:
>>
>> I'm attempting configuration of mod_nss to use an OCSP responder. My
>> OCSP responder uses a self signed certificate (call it OCSPcert) to
>> sign responses, my web server uses a certificate (call it SERVERcert)
>>
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