Re: PKCS#11 Module for TPM availiable

2009-07-09 Thread Martin Schneider
Hello Subrata and others Thanks for your reply. Unfortunately this doesn't work for me. > Here is a bash shell-script that I have used to start the Opencryptoki > PKCS#11 driver : > # BIOS Set up > # Step 1. Turn the computer off. > # Step 2. Turn the computer on and press F1 to enter the BIOS se

Re: PKCS#11 Module for TPM availiable

2009-07-09 Thread Martin Schneider
Hello Peter and others, > I should start by saying that a TPM's functionality is not equivalent to > that of other hardware tokens, such as smart cards.  A TPM only provides a > subset of the functionality of a regular PKCS#11 token.  A TPM, however, > also providers things that PKCS#11 tokens don

Re: PKCS#11 Module for TPM availiable

2009-07-09 Thread Michael Ströder
Martin Schneider wrote: > I think they keystore on > opencryptoki follows exactly the principle how storing other things > "in" the TPM works: building an encrypted key hierarchy that is stored > on harddisk with an encryption key rooted in the Storage Root Key in > the TPM. Isn't that how most HS

Re: Renaming cert on import (or using certutil)

2009-07-09 Thread David Stutzman
Michael Kaply wrote: I'm importing a code signing cert into my database using pk12util, but it gets assigned a random alias: e33eb463-ddba-4895-9469-bfdd01c71fe2 Is there a way via the command line utilities to rename that to a more human name? I'm sure I did this in the past, but I can't f

Re: PKCS#11 Module for TPM availiable

2009-07-09 Thread Anders Rundgren
That TPMs cannot sign CSRs is true but TPMs can do something similar and IMHO much more interesting which attesting that a public key (and thus indirectly the associated private key) was created inside of the TPM. The problem here is that few APIs and even fewer protocols deals with this kind o

Re: PKCS#11 Module for TPM availiable

2009-07-09 Thread David Stutzman
Michael Ströder wrote: Martin Schneider wrote: I think they keystore on opencryptoki follows exactly the principle how storing other things "in" the TPM works: building an encrypted key hierarchy that is stored on harddisk with an encryption key rooted in the Storage Root Key in the TPM. Isn't

Re: attack against AES-256 with complexity 2^119

2009-07-09 Thread Ian G
On 8/7/09 19:52, Eddy Nigg wrote: On 07/08/2009 08:35 PM, Paul Hoffman: At 8:08 PM +0300 7/8/09, Eddy Nigg wrote: Funny that today it's better to use AES-128. Why do you say that? It's the opposite of what the people who wrote the paper say. I've not read it today, but IIRC AES-128 remained

Re: attack against AES-256 with complexity 2^119

2009-07-09 Thread Peter Djalaliev
AFAIK, 2^119 is the worst-time complexity of the attack. Breaking a 256-bit key through a brute-force attack takes 2^256 operations in the worst case. The 'X/2' you are talking about is the average case, right? We are not looking for collisions here, so the birthday paradox doesn't apply... Best

Re: attack against AES-256 with complexity 2^119

2009-07-09 Thread Ian G
On 9/7/09 17:33, Peter Djalaliev wrote: AFAIK, 2^119 is the worst-time complexity of the attack. Breaking a 256-bit key through a brute-force attack takes 2^256 operations in the worst case. The 'X/2' you are talking about is the average case, right? We are not looking for collisions here, so

Re: attack against AES-256 with complexity 2^119

2009-07-09 Thread Peter Djalaliev
> "The weakness was discovered when we looked at AES as a hash function, > and tried to find weaknesses that are specific for hash functions. We > think that most cryptographers used only blockcipher-oriented > techniques, against which AES was well protected by the designers." > All this quote sa

Re: attack against AES-256 with complexity 2^119

2009-07-09 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 3:16 PM +0200 7/9/09, Ian G wrote: >Although I haven't read it at all, normally what happens is that the strength >of an algorithm of X bits is X/2. Say what!?! AES is an encryption function, not a hash function. AES-256 has a strength of 256 bits. -- dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-cr

Re: Renaming cert on import (or using certutil)

2009-07-09 Thread Michael Kaply
Appreciate the detailed explanation. Unfortunately I'm getting a segmentation fault on the export of the test.pem to my new pfx file... Very strange... Mike On 7/9/09 6:38 AM, David Stutzman wrote: Michael Kaply wrote: I'm importing a code signing cert into my database using pk12util, but

Re: Renaming cert on import (or using certutil)

2009-07-09 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
On 2009-07-08 22:37 PDT, Michael Kaply wrote: > I'm importing a code signing cert into my database using pk12util, but > it gets assigned a random alias: > > e33eb463-ddba-4895-9469-bfdd01c71fe2 That's a Microsoft Windows GUID. The most likely cause of this is that you exported the cert and pri

PK12UTIL not importing entire chain

2009-07-09 Thread Michael Kaply
I'm trying to figure out a different behavior I'm seeing today vs. NSS I was using about a year ago. Basically I have a code signing cert that contains a complete chain and my memory of importing a year ago (and looking at the DB files that I have generated from when I did that work), it has a

Re: PKCS#11 Module for TPM availiable

2009-07-09 Thread Subrata Mazumdar
Please see my inline responses. Martin Schneider wrote: Hello Subrata and others Thanks for your reply. Unfortunately this doesn't work for me. Here is a bash shell-script that I have used to start the Opencryptoki PKCS#11 driver : # BIOS Set up # Step 1. Turn the computer off. # Step 2.