On 17/07/2014 01:26, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> On Wed, July 16, 2014 11:42 pm, Falcon Darkstar Momot wrote:
>> When it comes to key material, it's an outstanding idea to err on the
>> side of caution.
>>
>> Does anyone actually require this feature in a non-deb
7;t break compliance.
--Falcon Darkstar Momot
--Security Consultant, Leviathan Security Group
On 16/07/2014 16:37, Robert Relyea wrote:
> On 07/16/2014 07:31 AM, Jonathan Schulze-Hewett wrote:
>> Does having this enabled violate the FIPS 140 requirements on
>> exposing key material
On 12/07/2014 05:33, Anders Rundgren wrote:
> Somewhat unfortunate for Microsoft and Intel who have "bet the house"
> on TPMs (Trusted Platform Modules), all their competitors in the
> mobile space including Google and Apple, have rather settled on
> embedded TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) sch
On 1/3/2014 2:04 PM, Julien Vehent wrote:
On 2014-01-03 12:58, ianG wrote:
On 3/01/14 19:24 PM, Julien Vehent wrote:
On 2014-01-02 18:59, ianG wrote:
On 3/01/14 01:06 AM, Julien Vehent wrote:
3DES isn't broken.
No, but it is end of life. 112bit security for the 2key variant, and
an 8 by
On 19/05/2013 09:09, Eddy Nigg wrote:
> On 05/19/2013 03:13 PM, From Kai Engert:
>> On Sun, 2013-05-19 at 02:15 -0600, Falcon Darkstar Momot wrote:
>>> It worked, but isn't signed.
>> The message is shown as signed by evolution.
>>
>> I believe you exper
It worked, but isn't signed.
On 19/05/2013 02:09, Kai Engert wrote:
> The mailing list was configured to allow application/x-pkcs7-signature,
> but it didn't allow application/pkcs7-signature. I've changed the
> configuration to allow the latter, too.
>
> Previous messages that were signed were di
On 02/05/2013 03:10, Sean Leonard wrote:
> Can't respond to everything at once, but let me at least try to pick
> of the easy ones:
>
> On 5/1/2013 4:44 PM, Brian Smith wrote:
>> Sean Leonard wrote:
>>> The Microsoft Windows CryptoAPI stack allows users (and admins) to
>>> load CRLs manually, not j
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