> I read your replacement a little different.
>
> - if ((InCustomMode () && UserPhysicalPresent ()) || ((mPlatformMode ==
> SETUP_MODE) && !IsPk)) {
>
> with
>
> + if ( (InCustomMode () && UserPhysicalPresent ())
> + || ( (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE)
> +&& !(FeaturePcdGet (PcdRequ
Hi Sean,
> From looking over the patch 1/4 email i have a concern.
>
> In AuthService.c on the conditional change you made. Aren't we losing
> a case where we are evaluating a nonPK payload signed by the PK?
> Given the system is in SetupMode that means there is no PK but is this
> the conditional
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4305
Based on whether the DER-encoded ContentInfo structure is present in
authenticated SetVariable payload or not, the SHA-256 OID can be
located at different places.
UEFI specification explicitly states the driver shall support both
cases, but
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2506
Change the default value of PcdRequireSelfSignedPk to FALSE in
accordance with UEFI spec, which states that PK need not be
self-signed when enrolling in setup mode.
Note that this relaxes the legacy behavior, which required the PK to
be sel
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2506
Per UEFI spec, enrolling a new PK in setup mode should not require a
self-signature. Introduce a feature PCD called PcdRequireSelfSignedPk
to control this requirement. Default to TRUE in order to preserve the
legacy behavior.
Cc: Jiewen Yao
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2506
In all DSC files that define SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE, opt-in into requiring
self-signed PK when SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE is TRUE.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel
Cc: Jiewen Yao
Cc: Jordan Justen
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann
Cc: Rebecca Cran
Cc: Peter Grehan
Cc: Sebasti
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2506
In all DSC files that define SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE, opt-in into requiring
self-signed PK when SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE is TRUE.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel
Cc: Leif Lindholm
Cc: Sami Mujawar
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann
Signed-off-by: Jan Bobek
---
ArmVirtPkg/Arm
Hi all,
I'm sending out v1 of my patch series that addresses a UEFI spec
non-compliance when enrolling PK in setup mode. Additional info can be
found in bugzilla [1]; the changes are split into 4 patches as
suggested by Laszlo Ersek in comment #4.
I've based my work on the patch by Matthew Carlso
> I linked email with Bugzilla. Either email or Bugzilla is OK for the
> discussion.
Sounds good.
> Personally, I don't understand one thing.
> If EDKII causes such failure, how the archlinux validates the correctness of
> the tool and document in [3] ?
>
> Or are they using a different UEFI imp
> Hi
> That is good catch!
> My apology to miss it before.
>
> 1) Please file a bugzilla (https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/) to record the
> issue and associate to the patch.
Filed bug 4305 [1]. Sorry for the delay, I didn't get my bugzilla
credentials until late last week.
> 2) Would you please s
Anothing ping. Comments/reviews/merge highly appreciated.
Thank you,
-Jan
Jan Bobek writes:
> Ping. Can I get a review and/or some comments on this patch, please?
>
> Thanks,
> -Jan
>
> Jan Bobek writes:
>
>> Based on whether the DER-encoded ContentInfo structure is present in
>> authenticated S
Ping. Can I get a review and/or some comments on this patch, please?
Thanks,
-Jan
Jan Bobek writes:
> Based on whether the DER-encoded ContentInfo structure is present in
> authenticated SetVariable payload or not, the SHA-256 OID can be
> located at different places.
>
> UEFI specification expl
Based on whether the DER-encoded ContentInfo structure is present in
authenticated SetVariable payload or not, the SHA-256 OID can be
located at different places.
UEFI specification explicitly states the driver shall support both
cases, but the old code assumed ContentInfo was not present and
inco
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