Hi all,
because of the fact that the autocorr-* packages belong to libreoffice,
why not rename them to libreoffice-autocorr-*? So this would reflect the
connectivity with libreoffice.
Kind regards
Joachim Backes
--
Fedora release 21 (Twenty One)
Kernel-3.18.2-200.fc21.x86_64
Joachim Backes
Compose started at Sat Jan 17 05:15:04 UTC 2015
Broken deps for i386
--
[Sprog]
Sprog-0.14-27.fc20.noarch requires perl(:MODULE_COMPAT_5.18.0)
[aeskulap]
aeskulap-0.2.2-0.19beta1.fc22.i686 requires libofstd.so.3.6
aesku
Hi
I want to report this problem, I do not know if they're already aware
sorry for the noise ...
Processing files: pdfbox-1.8.8-1.fc22.noarch
Executing(%doc): /bin/sh -e /var/tmp/rpm-tmp.eVWBxr
+ umask 022
+ cd /builddir/build/BUILD
+ cd pdfbox-1.8.8
+
DOCDIR=/builddir/build/BUILDROOT/pdfbox-1.8
On Sáb, 2015-01-17 at 10:28 +0100, Joachim Backes wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> because of the fact that the autocorr-* packages belong to libreoffice,
> why not rename them to libreoffice-autocorr-*? So this would reflect the
> connectivity with libreoffice.
IMHO I agree
repoquery --whatrequires autoc
Hi
On Fri, Jan 16, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Lubomir Rintel wrote:
> For this reason, I avoid privilege escalation when I need to conduct
> privileged operations, but open a separate session. The sshd daemon
> running with root privileges is more trustworthy to me than my user
> session.
I have no idea
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On Sat, 17 Jan 2015 03:44:10 +
Peter Robinson wrote:
> >> >>> > > that all being said. koji doesn't use any caching and will
> >> >>> > > not use the lvm plugin. we make every buildroot from
> >> >>> > > scratch using a fully clean environment to
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On Thu, 15 Jan 2015 20:49:49 -0500
Colin Walters wrote:
>
> Bear in mind that a dynamic Workstation scenario as you appear to
> have primarily in mind is about the last targeted use case. Beyond
> the Atomic Host for Docker scenario, I am aiming
Neal Becker wrote:
>I personally know nothing of the subject, but found this article, I
>wonder if there's any truth here? If so, maybe the push for dnssec on
>f22 isn't as wonderful as supposed:
>
>http://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/
"DNSSEC is Unnecessary"
His argument seems
On 01/17/2015 09:02 AM, Rahul Sundaram wrote:
> Hi
>
> On Fri, Jan 16, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Lubomir Rintel wrote:
>
> For this reason, I avoid privilege escalation when I need to conduct
> privileged operations, but open a separate session. The sshd daemon
> running with root privileges
On Sat, 17 Jan 2015, Björn Persson wrote:
Both CAs and DNSSEC can be attacked by governments in different ways.
The author thinks that DNSSEC is more vulnerable. I happen to disagree,
but more importantly, those who feel that they need to can secure their
keys both through DANE and with a certif
Bohuslav Kabrda wrote:
> Please note, that this proposal is absolutely not about imposing some
> restrictions on who can/should maintain what. It's really just a
> categorization of packages based on our WG's perception of importance to
> Fedora.
Sure, but there is still a distinction in that prop
Björn Persson wrote:
> Except when they have really serious errors.
>
> I once had an X problem that prevented Openoffice from working. It
> showed no window, output nothing, and terminated immediately with an
> exit code of zero. In other words it behaved just like the command
> "true". That's go
Orion Poplawski wrote:
> Sounds good to me - my users (old unix folks who always use the command
> line) are always complaining about this. Where do we tweak that?
Unfortunately, it can't really be done without modifications to either Qt or
the Qt applications. Either we build the applications w
Reindl Harald wrote:
> in fact DNSSEC is the prerequisite for
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Named_Entities
> which has the potential to replace the horrible need of CA signed
> certificates for SSL which are in fact *completly* unrelieable because
> every random of the
On Sun, 18 Jan 2015, Kevin Kofler wrote:
This is becoming rather of-topic for DNS. I think they key thing to
remember is that DNSSEC reduces the number of parties that can send
malicious or forged DNS messages from "infinite" to "a few" and where
these "few" are also part of the current "infinite
Am 18.01.2015 um 03:43 schrieb Kevin Kofler:
Reindl Harald wrote:
in fact DNSSEC is the prerequisite for
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Named_Entities
which has the potential to replace the horrible need of CA signed
certificates for SSL which are in fact *completly* u
16 matches
Mail list logo
